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This Article analyzes empirical data on one of America's fastest grow-
ing credit products, the title loan. A title loan is a high-interest, deeply over-
secured, consumer loan, in which the consumer uses an unencumbered auto-
mobile as collateral for a non-purchase money loan. Title loans are made
based solely on equity in a car. If a customer has insufficient income to pay
the payments under the loan, typically interest-only payments at 300% per
annum or more, the lender repossesses the vehicle, many of which have GPS
trackers installed for this purpose. Not surprisingly, the repossession rates
for title loans are higher than regular auto repossession rates, as well as
home foreclosure rates. Prior to repossession, lenders recover their princi-
pal many times over. For example, one customer paid over $10,000 on her
$4000 loan. Another paid over $11,000 on a loan of $1500. Despite these
realities, title loans have garnered little interest in the scholarly world. While
legislatures around the nation struggle with how to regulate home loans,
credit cards, and other middle class products, title loans go largely unnoticed
and unregulated. This Article reports on data about who uses these loans
and how often, as well as on repossession rates. It concludes that, given the
protections we have provided to middle class consumer credit users, we also
should regulate the consumer credit products used primarily by the lower and
working classes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Susan Price was recently in a legal aid office, looking for an easy an-
swer to a complex problem.' She filed for bankruptcy in 2005 after she be-
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1. Ms. Price is a client in the University of New Mexico Clinical Law Program.
Her name has been changed, but the numbers recounted here reflect her actual loan.
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came disabled. She now receives $980 a month in disability payments and
her rent is $550. Not so bad unless you consider her last move to make ends
meet. She borrowed $4000 to make it through the holidays and pay off some
bills, using her $10,000 Jeep as collateral.2 The Jeep was the last vestige of
her formerly middle class life.
Under the terms of her eighteen-month loan, she pays $581.47 a month
and will pay over $10,466.46 to pay off the $4000 loan.3 Another client,
Sean, paid $11,516 total on a $1500 loan. He renewed his loan forty times
before the borrower buried his pride and asked his parents to pay off the
$1500 in principal.4 As Sean later explained, "I was too embarrassed to ask
my parents for the initial loan money, ended up borrowing money from them
to make some of the payments and ultimately had to ask them to pay off the
whole loan, after losing tons of money along the way."5
Welcome to the world of auto title lending. A title loan is a high-
interest, deeply over-secured consumer loan, in which the consumer uses an
unencumbered automobile as collateral for a non-purchase money loan.6 To
qualify for a title loan, a borrower must own his or her vehicle outright and
also must live in one of the thirty-six states that has no general interest rate or
usury cap on consumer loans.
Ms. Price's loan demonstrates one unique feature of title loans. We as-
sert that of all the consumer loan products in existence, this product is the
only one that is completely asset-based. With few exceptions, title lenders
have no interest in whether the consumer borrowing the money can afford to
pay back the loan or make the monthly interest payments.8 Ability to repay is
not part of the underwriting process.9 Nor need it be in order for lenders to
collect their loan and then some. Since some lenders lend at 40% of value or
less,10 they can rely on the car if the borrower stops making the monthly
payments. These practices also explain why some title lenders sell used cars
2. Loan contract between lender and Susan Price (May 17, 2010) (on file with
Missouri Law Review).
3. Id.
4. Telephone interview with Sean (Mar. 25, 2010). Confidential University of
New Mexico Clinical Law Program interview notes remain on file with authors.
5. Id.
6. See Christopher Neiger, Why Car Title Loans are a Bad Idea, CNN LIVING
(Dec. 8, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-10-08/living/aa.car.title.loans 1 car-title-
loan-interest-rates-responsible-lending-for-title-loans? s=PM:LIVING.
7. See infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
8. See Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title
Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 433 (2010) [hereinafter Consumer
Use].
9. See id.
10. See The Harsh Reality of Car Title Loans, TOTAL BANKRUPTCY BLOG (June
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as well.'' Only in this context would a lender loan $4000 to someone who
makes just $980 a month. By structuring a loan with $580 monthly payments
from a person who makes less than $1,000 a month, a lender can assure that
he or she will end up with the payments for some period, and then the car.
Title lenders insist that they rarely repossess borrowers' cars.12 They al-
so claim that consumers understand the terms of these loans before they take
out the loans' 3 and that their clientele is largely middle class.14 This Article,
and the empirical data contained in it, challenges these statements and con-
cludes that none of these claims are true.
Title loans have garnered little interest in the scholarly world,"5 particu-
larly compared to payday loans, a subject about which scholars have written
dozens of articles.16 Up until now, only one scholar has studied the title loan
11. See id. Some lender parking lots are full of used cars and their signs read,
"Buy here, pay here." See, e.g., Title Cash of New Mexico, 2900 Eubank, NE, Albu-
querque, New Mexico (Mar. 25, 2011).
12. See Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 435.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 441-42.
15. We have identified only one author who has written a scholarly article spe-
cifically about title loans, which is discussed below. See Consumer Use, supra note
8. For a discussion of this article, see infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. A
few scholars have written about title lending in the context of the broader topic of
high-interest loans. See Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two Tiered Con-
sumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and its Challenge
to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L.
REV. 589 (2000); Mark S. Edelman, Robert A. Aitken & Raechelle C. Yballe, The
Road Ahead: Emerging Trends in Personal Property Finance, 63 Bus. LAW. 597, 597
(2008); Jean Ann Fox, Fringe Bankers: Economic Predators or A New Financial
Services Model?, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 135 (2007); Jim Hawkins, Regulating on
the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress,
86 IND. L.J. 1361, 1394 (2011); Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How
Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 165, 166 (2010); Jessie Lundberg, Comment, Big Interest Rates
Under the Big Sky: The Case for Payday and Title Lending Reform in Montana, 68
MONT. L. REV. 181 (2007). There also have been a few practitioner-oriented articles
written that discuss title lending as part of the broader topic of consumer finance. See
Frank Burt et al., Journey to the Fringe: A Survey of Select Fringe Lending Products
in 11TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE 365-75 (PLI
Corp. L. and Prac. Course, Handbook Series No. 8565, 2006) WL 1532 PLl/Corp.
349; Annesley H. DeGaris, Car Title Lending, 2 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
JUSTICE: AAJ ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS (July 2007); Daniel A.
Edleman, Fringe Lending in 1lTH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION INSTITUTE 416-17 (PLI Corp. L. and Prac. Course, Handbook Series No.
8565, 2006) WL 1532 PLI/Corp. 409.
16. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004);
Richard R.W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 997 (2006); Car-
men M. Butler & Niloufar A. Park, Mayday Payday: Can Corporate Social Responsi-
2012] 43
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industry in any depth, and this scholar reached the following conclusions: 1)
that title loans are better for consumers than payday loans, 2) that few cus-
tomers have their cars repossessed when taking out title loans, 3) that the
terms of title loans are transparent and easy for customers to understand, and
4) that most payday loan customers make $50,000 or more a year.17 This
scholar claimed to use New Mexico data to reach these conclusions. 8
bility Save Payday Lenders?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL'Y 119 (2005); Daniel A.
Edelman, Payday Loans: Big Interest Rates and Little Regulation, 11 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 174, 174-75 (1999); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd
Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23-97 (2002); Ronald J. Mann
& Jim Hawkins, Just until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007); Nathalie Martin,
1,000% Interest - Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and
Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (2010); Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong, Double
Down-and-Out: The Connection Between Payday Loans and Bankruptcy, 39 Sw. L.
REV. 785 (2010); Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
169 (2007); Michael A. Stegman & Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model
that Encourages Chronic Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8 (2003); Therese Wilson,
The Inadequacy of the Current Regulatory Response to Payday Lending, 32 AUSTL.
Bus. L. REV. 193, 198-206 (2004); Michael Bertics, Note, Fixing Payday Lending:
The Potential of Greater Bank Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133 (2005);
Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to
the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2001); Diane Hellwig, Note, Exposing the Loansharks in Sheep's
Clothing: Why Re-Regulating the Consumer Credit Market Makes Economic Sense,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567 (2005); Lisa Blaylock Moss, Commentary, Modern
Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & the Need for Regulation,
51 ALA. L. REV. 1725 (2000). For information on the general issue of fringe lending,
see Barr, supra; Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvest-
ment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005); Brooks, supra; Johnson,
supra note 15; Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Pref-
erences Among Low-income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008); Susan Lorde
Martin & Nancy White Huckins, Consumer Advocates v. the Rent-to-Own Industry:
Reaching a Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 385 (1997); Moss, supra,
at 1731-33.
17. See Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 427-43. A shorter version of this article
appears in Todd Zywicki, Money to Go, 33 REGULATION 32 (2010), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv33n2/regv33n2-7.pdf [hereinafter Money to
Go]. See also Todd Zywicki & Gabriel Okolski, Potential Restrictions on Title Lend-
ing, 62 MERCATUS ON POL'Y 1, 1-2 (2009). Zywicki's three scholarly articles on the
subject, all similar in content and all published in 2009 and 2010, can be wrapped up
in one thought: title lending is useful to many consumers and should not be regulated.
See Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 441-42; Money to Go, supra, at 37; Zywicki &
Okolski, supra, at 3. Without any documentation, all of the articles insist that the
typical customer of title lenders make about $50,000 annually. See Consumer Use,
supra note 8, at 442; Money to Go, supra, at 34; Zywicki & Okolski, supra, at 2.
Zywicki and his co-authors rely almost exclusively on industry interviews to support
their numbers, see, for example, Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 434 n.27, 442 n.59;
Money to Go, supra, at I n.5; Zywicki & Okolski, supra, at 2 n.10, interviews that
44 [Vol. 77
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The actual data from New Mexico, as well as from a number of other
states, show that none of these facts are likely true. Co-author Ozymandias
Adams interviewed each title lender in Albuquerque in business in October of
2011 to determine various industry practices and analyzed data collected by
the state of New Mexico. This Article reflects the results of this comparison,
along with other conclusions and insights into the typical terms of a title loan,
the actual repossession rates nationwide, and the demographics of users.19
The Article also discusses the national problems with enforcement of licens-
ing laws and describes the strictly asset-based nature (as opposed to borrower
income-based nature) of this form of lending. 20
This Article also describes the reality of repossession. Lenders fre-
quently repossess.2 1 In fact, our research shows that as many as 71% of the
title loan customers have their vehicles repossessed.22 Once reclamation rates
are taken into account, as many as 60% of customers lose their vehicles per-
manently. This rate is over ten times higher than the current home foreclo-
sure rate in the United States,23 and for the demographic that uses title loans,
the loss of the car is similar in gravity. The customers are, for the most part,
from the working classes,24 and having a paid-off car can be one of their
were turned into a report and used to influence the New Mexico legislature. Most of
the information in this report appears to have been provided to the New Mexico Leg-
islature by industry insider Robert Reich, the current president of Texas Car Title
Loan Services and Community Loans of America. See William J. Verant, Consumer
Lending Study Committee Report for the Forty Fourth Session of the New Mexico
State Legislature, Submitted by the Financial Institutions Division Director, as re-
quested by House Memorial 36 (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter INDUSTRY REPORT TO NEW
MEXICO LEGISLATURE] (on file with author).
18. See Money to Go, supra note 17, at 34.
19. See infra notes 193-216 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
21. Burt et al., supra note 15, at 370 (quoting repossession rates of between 5%
and 20%); see also JEAN ANN Fox & ELIZABETH Guy, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM.,
DRIVEN INTO DEBT: CFA CAR TITLE LOAN STORE & ON-LINE SURVEY 5 (2005),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Car Title_LoanReport 111705.pdf;
AMANDA QUESTER & JEAN ANN Fox, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING & CONSUMER
FED'N OF AM., CAR TITLE LENDING: DRIVING BORROWERS TO FINANCIAL RUIN 7
(2005), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/other-consumer-loans/car-
title-loans/research-analysis/rr008-CarTitle Lending-0405.pdf.
22. See Table 14.2, infra.
23. Ryan M. Goodstein et al., Are Foreclosures Contagious? 26 fig.1(FDIC Ctr.
for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2011-4, 2011) (finding the foreclosure rate in
2008 to be a little over 3%); see Gaurav Singh & Kelly Bruning, The Mortgage Crisis
Its Impact and Banking Restructure, 10 ACAD. BANKING STUD. J. 23, 31 (2011).
According to Singh and Bruning "[b]y August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages out-
standing were either delinquent or in foreclosure," and the average national foreclo-
sure rate was 1.84%. Id.
24. See Fox & GUY, supra note 21, at 3. According to these authors,
2012] 45
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greatest financial accomplishments. The loans are designed not to be repaid,
so in a sense, repossession rates are surprisingly low.25 Repossession rates
this high are unlike any other in the secured lending world. Additionally, this
Article also shows how large profits can be in this industry, as well as how
large the industry is overall.
The Article concludes that, while the interest rates for title loans typical-
ly are lower than the interest rates for payday loans (100-300% versus 400-
600%), title loans generally are more harmful to consumers than payday
26loans. Finally, this Article concludes that, because we regulate consumer
credit products the middle class uses, 27 we also should do so for credit prod-
28
ucts the lower class uses.28 To do otherwise leaves those people most in need
of protection, unprotected.
[a] few state regulators provide information on title loan borrowers. Mis-
souri's Auditor reported that 70 percent of payday and title loan customers
earned less than $25,000 per year. Illinois title loan users had average
salaries of less than $20,000 according to a Department of Financial Insti-
tutions study in 1999. New Mexico regulators report that the average in-
come of title loan borrowers, as reported by licensees for 2004, was
$21,818.50.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Gregory Elliehausen, Consumers' Use of High-Price
Credit Products: Do They Know What They are Doing? 19 tbl.5 (Networks Fin. Inst.
at Ind. State Univ., Working Paper No. 2006-WP-02, 2006) (stating in a fascinating
table that the total household - not individual - income of persons taking out auto title
loans as: less than $15,000 (11.9%), $15,000-24,999 (17.4%), $25,000-49,999
(40.8%), $50,000 or more (30.2%), and clarifying that payday loan customers are
better off financially than title loan customers).
25. QUESTER & Fox, supra note 21, at 6. According to these authors,
[tlitle lenders often make their short-term, high-interest loans with little or
no regard to their borrowers' ability to repay the loans. Because a car se-
cures each loan, the lender is protected even if the borrower defaults.
Lenders frequently advertise that they do not perform credit checks, that
loans can be completed on the spot, and that the application will take only
a few minutes. For instance, a recent online advertisement stated: "If you
own a car, you qualify!"
Unfortunately, title lenders also often target borrowers who can ill af-
ford such high-cost short-term balloon loans, virtually guaranteeing that
many of the loans will fail.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (regulating credit cards).
28. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
46 [Vol. 77
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II. THE BACKGROUND, CONTEXT, AND REGULATION
OF TITLE LENDING
This Part describes the nuts and bolts of title lending, the place of title
lending in the overall milieu of high-interest consumer credit products, and
the regulation of title lending in the United States.29
A. Title Loans: How They Work (or Don't Work)
Just as the late-night advertising suggests, getting a title loan is quick
and easy. As one internet advertiser proclaims:
Need Cash Today? Have a Clear Car Title?
Apply for an Auto Title Loan Today and Get up to $50,000 Cash
No Credit Checks I Flexible Terms I Keep Your Car I Cash in 30
Minutes
Just complete our Application Below or Call . . . to get Pre-
Approved Now! 30
Securing a title loan is easy, as our phone interview data show. All one needs
is a clear title to his or her car and an extra set of keys. Once the customer
has filled out the basic paperwork, the borrower gives the actual title to the
29. Very little has been written about the history of title lending, though some
scholars suggest that title loans grew out of the pawn industry. See Drysdale & Keest,
supra note 15, at 598. As they claim:
The auto and auto-title pawn loans were designed to take advantage of this
special treatment afforded pawn transactions while enjoying the security
afforded by taking the consumer's transportation as collateral for a very
small cash loan. While a few auto pawnbrokers demand physical posses-
sion of the vehicle, such practice obviously creates greater sales re-
sistance. Thus was born the auto-title pawn, or "title loan." The first in-
carnation echoed the sale/leaseback schemes that have long been used to
dodge usury laws. The borrower pledges the title, and the pawnbroker
"leases" the vehicle back to the consumer. Some lenders require the cus-
tomer to turn over a key to the car to facilitate repossession. They com-
monly limit the loan amount to one-third of the book value of the car,
making the loans more than fully secured. While some transactions may
involve weekly installments, the typical title loan is a one month, single
payment loan.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
30. 1 STOP AUTO TITLE LOANS, http://www.1stopautotitleloans.com/titleloans.
html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
2012] 47
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lender, who holds on to the title until the loan is paid.3 ' Some lenders do not
perfect their lien in the vehicle by filing in the motor vehicle division of the
state. In some states, such as Nevada, the law provides that the lender may
perfect by holding the title. 32
Thereafter, in a prototypical loan,33 the borrower is to return in one
month with the loan amount he or she borrowed plus the finance charge, 34
which can be any amount but is typically 300% per annum or 25% per
month. Thus, although terms can vary, if a borrower borrows $2000, the
borrower typically would owe $2500 in one month's time. The borrower
usually can renew the loan each month by paying the finance charge, 36 which
in this example is $500. However, the loans are not necessarily small.37 One
internet company offers loans of up to $50,000, 38 and the New Mexico state
data reflect loans up to $42,000.39 Moreover, the amount of each loan is un-
related to a person's income; the amount is based solely upon the value of the
vehicle used as collateral.
If a borrower does not pay the monthly loan payment, which is usually
an interest-only payment, 40 a lender can add the monthly payment to the loan,
then charging interest on interest, or 300% on 300%. If this is done, the
amount of the loan can balloon into a huge debt. Repossessions are rampant
31. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 15, at 598.
32. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 604A.050 (West, Westlaw through 2009 75th
Reg. Sess. and 2010 26th Spec. Sess. of the Nev. Legis. and technical corrections
received from the Legis. Council Bureau (2010)).
33. These are the most common terms, but as Part II.B.2 of this Article shows,
the loan terms vary, certainly far more than we anticipated.
34. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 15, at 598-99.
35. See id. (referring to title loan interest rates between 200% and nearly
1000%).
36. See id. at 599.
37. Conversely, Professor Hawkins claims that "[t]wo important characteristics
set pawn and auto title loans apart from other sources of credit - the amounts of the
loans are usually quite small and customers have an escape hatch if they cannot pay
off the loan." See Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1388. He further claims that "[t]hese
two characteristics cast serious doubt on the assertion that pawnbroking and auto title
lending cause financial distress." Id. The loans we see, however, are neither small
nor non-recourse.
38. See Burt et al., supra note 15, at 369. To get an internet title loan, a customer
fills out the paperwork online, id. at 368-69, then goes to a store. Internet title loans
are allowed in many states, including South Carolina, California, Texas, Arizona,
New Mexico, Nevada, or Utah. See id. 369.
39. See infra Table 1.
40. See Questions and Answers, TITLE LOAN ADVOCATES, http://titleloan advo-
cates.org/QuestionsandAnswers.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (describing most
title loans as "interest only payments").
48 [ Vol. 77
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and to aid in the process, lenders usually request copies of car keys, 4' and
some lenders install a GPS tracking device so they can find and repossess the
42
car.
B. Title Lending in Context
Title lending is one way the working poor, lower-middle class, or any
American experiencing financial difficulties, can make ends meet and smooth
consumption.43  Other options include payday loans, refund anticipation
loans, pawn loans, and rent to own.
1. Payday Loans45
Payday loans are small, short-term, triple-digit interest rate loans, typi-
cally in the range of $200 to $500 dollars, secured by the consumer's post-
46dated check or debit authorization. Originally, these loans were designed to
get a consumer through payday and thus be paid back in one lump sum.47 A
typical short-term loan product in today's market allows a customer to bor-
row $400, for fourteen days or less, for a $100 fee.48 Most commonly, the
loan is an interest-only loan, with the interest payment, here $100, due every
two weeks thereafter. 49 The principal stays out indefinitely, and after two
months, the lender has recouped the principal. 50 Americans owe several bil-
lion dollars in title loans.5 ' Payday and other short-term loan outlets tripled in
number from 1999 to 200652 and now outnumber McDonald's, Burger Kings,
41. See Consumer Groups Call Car Title Loans Predatory, M SNBC.COM (Mar.
2, 2008, 6:38:09 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23436573/ns/business-con
sumer news/t/consumer-groups-call-car-title-loans-predatory/.
42. See, e.g., Neiger, supra note 6 (discussing a title loan utilizing GPS).
43. See Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1370. Personally, we think less overall
spending would help far more than very expensive smoothing, and we also find
smoothing itself to be an urban myth. See infra Part l.E.
44. See Patrick M. Aul, Note, Federal Usury Law for Service Members: The
Talent-Nelson Amendment, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 163, 164-65 (2008).
45. The content of this paragraph was taken from articles previously published
by the author. Martin, supra note 16, at 564; Martin & Koo, supra note 16, at 785-86.
46. Martin & Koo, supra note 16, at 785.
47. Id.
48. Kept out for one year, this loan would earn interest of $2,600, and the bor-
rower would still owe the $400.
49. Martin & Koo, supra note 16, at 785.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Aul, supra note 44, at 165. One customer noted that a shop with one em-
ployee in 2003 now has 6 employees. See Martin, supra note 16, at 564 n.4 (citing to
interview with study participant no. SBI 1).
492012]
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and Starbucks combined.53 The author's previous research suggests payday
lending is the fastest growing segment of the consumer-credit industry.54
These loans vary in design. For example, in one form of New Mexico in-
stallment loan, the customer borrows $100, "to be repaid in twenty-six bi-
weekly installments of $40.16 each, plus a final installment of $55.34." 5
Additionally, the loan payments may pay off very little of the loan principal.
The borrower in this example would pay $100 in principal and $999.71 in
interest, for an annual percentage rate (APR) of 1147%.
2. Refund Anticipation Loans
Refund anticipation loans (RALs) are "short-term loans extended to
consumers in anticipation of their tax refunds." Commercial tax preparers
market these loans as quick refunds, which allow taxpayers to immediately
access their refund.58  "In actuality, RALs are loans extended by banks
through a contractual arrangement with the tax preparer."5 9  Typically,
"[w]hen the [bank makes the] loan[, it] prepares to collect on the loan by
opening a temporary bank account for the borrower to receive electronic de-
posit of the refund." 60 The borrower signs documents that "instruct the IRS
to direct deposit the refund into that account."61
53. Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110,
1111 (2008) (stating that by 2002, there were more payday-loan stores in the United
States than McDonald's, Burger King, Sears, J.C. Penney, and Target stores com-
bined).
54. Martin, supra note 16, at 564.
55. Felix Salmon, Loan Sharking Datapoints of the Day, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2010,
19:37 EST), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking-data
points-of-the-day.
56. Id. This assumes the lender is not able to convince the borrower to re-
borrow the principal before the loan is paid back. See Martin, supra note 16, at 573-
76 (referring to Part L.C of article).
57. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation
Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 578
(2004).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 578.
60. Id. at 579 (quoting CHI CHI WU, JEAN ANN Fox, & ELIZABETH RENUART,
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., REFUND ANTICIPATION
LOAN REPORT 18-19 (2002)).
61. Id. As Professor Schiltz explains,
[t]he contract usually contains a right of setoff, so the lender is repaid
when the refund appears in the bank's account. The consumer is liable for
the full amount of the loan if the refund is disallowed in whole or in part.
The refund amount would be affected if, for example, [the] IRS disallows
[Vol. 7750
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Normally, a consumer pays "three fees in connection with RALs[:] a tax
preparation fee to the tax preparer, an electronic filing fee to the tax preparer,
and a loan fee to the bank making the loan." 62 The bank pays a portion of the
loan fee to the tax preparer.6 3 The loan fees vary "based on the size of the
refund, translating into [APRs] ranging from 67% to 608%."6 To get around
any interest rate caps states impose, "the loans are extended by banks char-
tered in states with no restrictions on interest charges."6 5 Until recently, two
66
of the largest tax preparers, H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt, offered RALs.
The availability of RALs is diminishing now that the IRS no longer
gives tax preparers and financial institutions a debt report that indicates
whether a tax refund will be reduced to pay past-due student loans, child sup-
port payments, or other debt. H&R Block, a company based in Kansas
a deduction or if there is an intercept of the refund for child support or a
student loan debt.
Id. (alteration in original).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 579.
65. See id.
66. Id.; see also John Malseed, Costly Tax Refund Loans Dwindle in Availability,
WCF COURIER (Iowa), Mar. 21, 2011, http://wcfcourier.com/business/local/3abl0ed0-
517f-l le0-8722-001cc4cO3286.html. According to Malseed,
[m]ore than 7 million people used RALs in 2009. They paid about $606
million in fees and another $58 million in add-on charges, according to a
study issued by the National Consumer Law Center and the Consumer
Federation of America. That compares to 8.4 million, who paid $738 mil-
lion in fees, in 2008, according to the same organization.
Id.
67. See id.; see also Danielle Douglas, End of the RALs?, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/capital business/end-of-the-rals/2011/03/25/
AFQJVkbstory.html. According to the Douglas article, a more rigorous regulatory
climate created the end to RALs, a controversial product that consumer advocates
lambasted as predatory because of its proliferation in low-income communities. Id
The article goes on to say that
[y]ears of petitioning state and federal officials to rein in RALs yielded
substantial results in 2010 that have crippled the market in a matter of
months. Under pressure from consumer groups, J.P. Morgan Chase, one
of the three largest lenders underwriting refund loans, pulled out of the
market in April. The Internal Revenue Service then announced in August
it would no longer provide tax preparers and financial institutions a key
credit check on taxpayers for RALs. And by December, H&R Block
bowed out when its banking partner HSBC terminated their agreement,
thanks to a directive from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
As a result of the departure of J.P. Morgan and the actions of the OCC,
only three community banks are originating RALs this year: Louisville-
based Republic Bank & Trust, River City Bank in the same city, and Ohio
512012]
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City, Missouri, was one of the largest providers of RALs until it decided to
68
stop offering them during the 2012 tax season. Moreover, "[t]he Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is seeking a $2 million fine against
Republic Bank & Trust of Kentucky," the only lender still offering RALs.
"The FDIC's investigation of Republic's RAL [loans] uncovered numerous
violations by tax preparers, acting as agents of Republic, of various consumer
protection laws."70
3. Pawn Loans
Many observers believe that title lending grew out of the pawn busi-
ness. 71 "[I]n pawn transactions, the customer gives the pawnshop some form
Valley Bank in Gallipolis, Ohio, according to the National Consumer Law
Center.
Id.
68. See Press Release, H&R Block, H&R Block Decides Not to Offer Refund
Anticipation Loans in 2012 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.hrblock.com/
press/Article.jsp?articleid=52784. According to the company,
"[w]e evaluated our options to determine what was best for our clients, the
business and our shareholders," said Bill Cobb, H&R Block[P]resident
and CEO. "Knowing we had a strong 2011 tax season without RALs, our
analysis did not present a compelling reason to bring back the product in
2012."
Id. H&R Block also said that it would offer refund anticipation checks (RAC) in-
stead, which are not loans but rather a pre-paid debit card onto which a refund is load-
ed. Id. See also CHI CHI WU & JEAN ANN Fox, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. &
CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., MAJOR CHANGES IN THE QUICK TAX REFUND LOAN
INDUSTRY 2-6 (2010), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www. con-
sumerfed.org/file/RAL%202010%2OReport%20final.pdf. According to this source,
"tax preparers and their bank partners made approximately 8.4 million RALs during
the 2008 tax-filing season." Id at 2. H&R Block "had about 3.9 million RAL cus-
tomers in 2008, or 46% of the RAL market." Id. at 6. The second largest provider,
Santa Barbara Bank and Trust, "had about 2.3 million RAL customers in 2008, and
Republic [Bank & Trust] had about half a million." See id. at 7.
69. See FDIC Seeks $2 Million Fine Against Republic Bank of Kentucky: Probe
Found Numerous Violations in Bank's Refund Anticipation Loan Program,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (May 10, 2011), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/
2011/05/fdic-seeks-2-million-fine-against-republic-bank-of-kentucky.html.
70. Id. "The FDIC charged that Republic 'is unable to appropriately manage,
monitor, and control third-party risk at its [tax preparers] in many aspects."' Id. (al-
teration in original). The FDIC also alleges "inadequate management, monitoring and
controlling [preparers] and third-party risk include a deficient training program; inad-
equate security for customer information and cash equivalents, including debit cards,
inadequate computer safeguards, and [preparers'] failure to comply with law and
regulation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
71. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 16, at 165 (stating that "[t]he title industry grew
out of pawnbrokers' efforts to lend larger amounts than televisions or jewelry could
52 [Vol. 77
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of personal property that the pawnshop holds as collateral for the loan given
to the customer." 72
As fringe banking products go, pawn loans are among the least harmful.
As Professor Jim Hawkins notes:
[e]ven those very critical of fringe banking recognize the benefit of
this structure: "One positive feature of pawn credit is its tendency
to be naturally short-term and terminal. Unlike payday loans
where consumers often are forced to repay their loans over rela-
tively long periods, a defaulting pawn debtor simply forfeits the
personal item left with the pawnbroker as collateral." Thus, for
those who associate financial distress with having unmanageable
debt, pawn broking [conclusively] can never directly cause finan-
cial distress because the debt is self-liquidating.
While Professor Hawkins equates title loans with pawn loans in declaring the
relative harmlessness of each,74 title loans are more harmful than pawn loans,
at least in New Mexico.
C. Title Loan Regulation: There's No "There There"
A majority of states have not enacted legislation or otherwise regulated
the title loan industry by capping fees at less than 100% of the amount bor-
rowed.75 As of the date of this publication, it appears that only twenty-one
collateralize"); Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 433 (stating that "[t]itle pledge lend-
ing grew out of traditional pawnbroker operations, mainly to enable making larger
loans than traditional pawnshop loans backed by items such as consumer electronics,
musical instruments, and jewelry"); see also Burt et al., supra note 15, at 366.
Though numerous scholars have stated that title lending is an offshoot of the pawn
industry, they offer no evidence of this. Currently, there is little connection between
making pawn loans and making title loans in New Mexico, where only three small
lenders authorized to make title loans are also pawn brokers. See Jessica J. Randall,
Pawnbroking in New Mexico: An Industry Misunderstood 26 (Dec. 10, 2010) (un-
published paper, University of New Mexico) (on file with author).
72. Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1388. For an excellent history of the pawn indus-
try, see JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS,
AND THE POOR 1 (1994) [hereinafter FRINGE BANKING]; see also Jarret C. Oeltjen,
Florida Pawnbroking: An Industry in Transition, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 996-98
(1996); see generally John P. Caskey, Explaining the Boom in Check-Cashing Outlets
and Pawnshops, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 4, 4-5 (1995) [(hereinafter Explaining
the Boom] (providing additional background information on the pawn industry).
73. Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1389 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 1393.
75. Leah A. Plunkett & Ana Lucia Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, Big Problems:
How States Protect Consumers from Abuses and How the Federal Government Can
Help, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31 app. A, at 56-63 (2011) [hereinafter Plunkett & Hur-
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states appear to attempt to regulate title lending, and most states enable high
interest, short-term loans.76 Idaho's statute77 merely requires title lenders to
78
obtain a license, give customers a written contract disclosing the cost of the
tado, Small-Dollar Loans] (citing LEAH A. PLUNKETr, EMILY CAPLAN & NATHANAEL
PLAYER, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS SCORECARD-
UPDATED 14-20 (2010)); see also Edelman et al., supra note 15, at 598-99 (2008)
(stating that "[c]urrently, sixteen states have enacted laws regulating title loans" and
that the laws sometimes "set limits on loan terms, such as maximum loan amounts,
interest rate caps, and costs, and regulate the frequency of renewals or extensions").
For prior history on state specific title loan laws, see Burt et al., supra note 15, at 371-
73.
76. See Plunkett & Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, supra note 75, at app. A 56-63
(citing SCORECARD 2010, supra note 75, at 14-20); see also Alabama, Pawn Shop
Act, ALA. CODE §§ 5-19A-1 to -20 (Westlaw through End of 2011 Reg. Sess.); Ari-
zona, Motor Vehicle Time Sales Disclosure Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-281 to
-295 (Westlaw through Ist Reg. Sess. and 3d Spec. Sess. of the 50th Legis. (2011));
Florida, Title Loans, FLA. STAT. §§ 537.001, .018 (2010); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-12-130 to -138 (LEXIS through 2011 Extraordinary. Sess.); Idaho, Title Loan
Act, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-46-501 to -509 (LEXIS through 2011 Reg. Sess.); Illi-
nois, Consumer Installment Loan Act, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, §§ 110.300, .350,
.390 (West, Westlaw through July 29, 2011); IOWA CODE § 537.2403 (Supp. 2011);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 286.10-260 to -530 (West, Westlaw through end
of 2011 Legis.); Minnesota, MINN. ANN. STAT. ANN. § 325J.07 (West, Westlaw
through end of the 2011 Reg. Sess.); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-413
(LEXIS through 2011 Reg. Sess. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.); Missouri, Mo. REV.
STAT. § 367.515 (Supp. 2010); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-816 to -817
(Westlaw through all 2011 laws, and 2010 ballot measures); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 604A.105 (West, Westlaw through 2009 75th Reg. Sess. and the 2010
26th Spec. Sess. of the Nev. Legis. and technical corrections received from the Legis.
Council Bureau (2010)); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-A:14
(Westlaw through Ch. 268 of 2011 Reg. Sess., not including changes and corrections
made by the State of New Hampshire, Office of Legis. Svcs.); New Jersey, N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 3:24-1.3 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 15, 2011; 43 N.J. Reg. No.
16); 2010 Or. Laws Ist. Spec. Sess. c. 23, § 20 (Westlaw through End of the 2011
Reg. Sess. and ballot measures approved at the Nov. 2, 2010 election, pending classi-
fication and text revision by the Oregon Reviser); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. H§
34-29-140, 37-3-201, and 37-3-413 (Westlaw through End of 2010 Reg. Sess.); Ten-
nessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-111 (LEXIS through 2011 Reg. Sess.); Utah, Title
Lending Registration Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-24-101 to -305 (West, Westlaw
through 2011 2d Spec. Sess.); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §41a(b)(4) (LEXIS
through 2011 Sess.).
77. Title Loan Act, 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 323 (H. 784) (July 1, 2006) (codi-
fied at IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-46-501 to -509.
78. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-503. A title loan made by an unlicensed
lender is void under Idaho law, and the lender forfeits the right to collect any monies
including principal, interest, and other fees paid by the debtor in connection with the
title loan agreement. Id.
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loan over its initial term, 7 and not loan more than the vehicle's value.so
Loans can be no longer than thirty days. The statute does not cap interest
82
rates, limit fees, or limit the number of loan renewals. After the third re-
newal, the borrower must pay at least 10% of the outstanding principal
amount in addition to any finance charges due.83 This loan is an interest-only
loan for three months, followed by many more months of interest, at a rate up
to 300%.84
Oregon and Montana have amended their laws to impose a 36% interest
rate cap on all consumer loans, including title loans. In Oregon, a title lend-
er can charge a one-time origination fee that does not exceed $10 per $100 of
the loan amount or $30, whichever is less.86 A lender also can collect one fee
per loan transaction for dishonored or insufficient funds checks, but the fee
cannot exceed $20.87 In addition, the Oregon statute prohibits the making or
88
renewing of title loans for a term of less than thirty-one days. Statutes also
prohibit title lenders from renewing an existing title loan secured by the same
certificate of title more than two times after the loan is first made.8 For the
79. See id. § 28-46-504. "The Idaho statute requires the lender and borrower to
execute a title lending agreement that must include statutorily required terms and
disclosures." Edelman et al., supra note 15, at 599 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-
504(1)(2)).
80. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-508(3). We do not think this provision is needed
to protect lenders or borrowers, since it is our understanding that it is industry practice
to lend no more than 40% of value, and many lenders typically lend a far lesser per-
centage. QUESTER & Fox, supra note 21, at 5 ("Most title loans are also made for
much less than the value of the car that secures the loan. The amount extended is
usually based on how much the car is worth and typically does not exceed 33% of the
car's value."). See also infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
81. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-506(1). Title loans cannot be renewed if: (1)
"[t]he debtor has paid all principal and finance charges due in accordance with the
title loan agreement;" (2) "[t]he debtor has surrendered possession, title and all other
interest in and to the titled personal property to the title lender; or" (3) "[t]he title
lender has notified the debtor in writing that the title loan agreement is not to be re-
newed." Id. Moreover, a lender cannot "[c]apitalize or add any accrued interest or
fee to the original principal." Id. § 28-46-508(8).
82. See id. § 28-46-506(3).
8 3. Id.
84. Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 434. Our own study data confirm that 300%
is a common interest rate for a title loan. See infra Appendix A.
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-241 (West, Westlaw through all 2011 laws, and
2010 ballot measures); 2010 Or. Laws 1st. Spec. Sess. c. 23, § 20 (Westlaw through
End of the 2011 Reg. Sess. and ballot measures approved at the Nov. 2, 2010 election,
pending classification and text revision by the Oregon Reviser).
86. 2010 Or. Laws Ist. Spec. Sess. c. 23, § 20(2). The 36% interest rate cap
excludes this origination fee. Id. § 20(1).
87. Id. § 19(l).
88. Id. § 20(3).
89. Id. § 20(9).
2012] 55
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most part, other than rate caps for all loans at 36%, most states that have
passed title lending legislation have authorized the types of triple-digit inter-
est, industry-friendly, loan transactions described here. 90
III. TITLE LOANS IN NEW MEXICO: THE DEVIL OR
THE DEEP BLUE SEA?
This Part reports on the specific data in Albuquerque, New Mexico, as
gathered by calling or visiting all lenders in the city and on data the state col-
lected. A list of all lenders in our phone survey can be found in Appendix A
and B. All lenders that offered title loans in Albuquerque in the fall of 2010
were contacted in order to determine their terms and practices. If a lender
had more than one location, the authors assumed that locations owned by the
same company had the same practices and terms.
Title lenders in Albuquerque, as in New Mexico generally, include a
number of national lenders and very few locally-owned businesses. The line
between local and national lenders, however, often is blurred. The only lend-
er in New Mexico to offer only title loans is New Mexico Title Loans, which
a Georgia company owns.91
90. PLUNKETT, KAPLAN & PLAYER, supra note 75, at 14-20 (identifying 25 states
that prohibit auto title loans, 8 of which set caps between 104% and 304% and 11 of
which have no APR caps). Certain federal laws, such as the National Defense Au-
thorization Act of 2006, attempt to curtail title lending in order to protect military
personnel and their family against certain lending practices. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 579, 119 Stat. 3136,
3276-77 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 992 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) (requiring the
DOD to issue the Report). These laws leave the rest of us to fend for ourselves, how-
ever. Moreover, anecdotally, we have heard that many military personnel are told to
avoid payday loans. See Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Inman, In Harms Way? Payday-
Loan Access and Military Personnel Performance 3 & n.3 (Research Dep't, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 08-18, 2008). We have heard anecdotally
that at one time, servicemen and women were subject to serious penalties for even
entering such establishments, along with "massage parlors" and other businesses of ill
repute.
91. See Stephen Franklin, Car Title Loans Snare Victims at 300% Rate, KANSAS
CITY STAR, Aug. 10, 2008, at D4; Corporations Division, NEW MEXICO PUB. REL.
COMMISSION, http://web.prc.newmexico.gov/Corplookup/(S(e3mvrl trrd4tlhnendv
vihrk))/CorpsSearch.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2011); see also New Mexico Title
Loans, POWERPROFILES.COM, http://www.powerprofiles.com/profile/000051535
39887/ COMMUNITY+LOANS+OF+AMERICA,+INC.-SANTA+FE-NM (last
visited Jan. 18, 2012) (stating that New Mexico Title Loans is a branch of Community
Loans of America). The president of New Mexico Title Loans, Robert Reich, is also
president of many title lending companies nationwide. See Franklin, supra; Corpora-
tions Division, supra. Mr. Reich's company, Community Loans of America, is the
largest title lender in America. See Franklin, supra. Mr. Reich is also the source of
the report cited by Zywicki in Money to Go, supra note 17, at 34.
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The State of New Mexico Financial Institutions Division (FID) gathers
title loan data directly provided by lenders through self-reporting question-
naires.92 From the time the state began requiring that title lenders file year-
end reports in 200493 until the present, interest rates on title loans made in
New Mexico have been reported in the range of 10,000% to 0%.94 As Ap-
pendix A shows, the average interest charged over the five years was above
300%.95 The zero percentage rate reflects the practice of offering consumers
the first loan free, which is a common marketing tactic in the Albuquerque
area. Some lenders also consider all their charges "fees." Thus, if a consum-
er asks the interest rate, they may say that there is none and may report a zero
percentage rate to the FID. 96
The FID requires that all entities that make title loans obtain an FID li-
cense,97 and it maintains a database of all such licensed lenders. All of these
licensed lenders must report annually various data to the FID.98 The FID
records these data in an annual Summary of Title Lending report. 99 In order
for any given percentage interest rate to be included in the Summary of Title
Lending report FID creates, the rate need only be offered to and accepted by a
single customer, so aggregated numbers can be skewed easily.100
92. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-15-10, -10.1 (West, Westlaw through Ist Reg.
Sess. 2011).
93. See N.M. CODE R. § 12.8.6.5 (West, Westlaw current through all new rules
amendments and appeals effective prior to Oct. 1, 2011) (showing effective date of
Jan. 1, 2004).
94. See infra Appendix A.
95. See infra Appendix A.
96. A representative with the New Mexico FID told us that "[s]ome companies
do report that they charge 0%, which has also been questioned by our department.
The companies who have reported 0% say that in some cases they have charged 0%,
but rarely does that happen." Telephone Interview with Representative, N.M. Fin.
Insts. Div. (Oct. 27, 2010).
97. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-3; Telephone Interview with Representative,
supra note 96.
98. See N.M. CODE R. § 12.8.6.6, .8.
99. See N.M. FIN. INST. Div., SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS (2008) [hereinafter
SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2008] (on file with authors); N.M. FIN. INST. Div.,
SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS (2007) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2007] (on
file with authors); N.M. FIN. INST. Div., SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS (2006)
[hereinafter SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2006] (on file with authors); N.M. FIN. INST.
Div., SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS (2005) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2005]
(on file with authors); N.M. FIN. INST. Div., SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS (2004) [here-
inafter SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2004] (on file with authors).
100. See sources cited supra note 99.
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A. Telephone Survey ofLenders
The purpose of the telephonic portion of our survey was to find out how
businesses offering auto title loans in New Mexico operate. We were most
interested in the fees and interest rates charged as well as the terms of the
loans. We also were interested in how title lenders present themselves to the
public. Our survey was limited to businesses making auto title loans in Albu-
querque, the largest city in New Mexico. We operated under the assumption
that business practices in the city would give a fair idea of how these compa-
nies operate in New Mexico as a whole. Moreover, as the introduction to this
Part indicates, most of the lenders are national; thus, these data may reflect
how this business operates nationwide. 101
1. Methodology
Identifying lenders making title loans in a particular market can be
tricky. Not all lenders advertise in the Yellow Pages or on the Internet, as
some lenders rely on drive-by business. Additionally, lenders come and go
and move in and out of this segment of the consumer finance world. We
made several attempts to capture all of the lenders in our data, but for reasons
explained in this section, we feel certain that we missed a few lenders.
We attempted to identify all the title lenders in Albuquerque by creating
a list of businesses that advertised title loans in Albuquerque. We first tried
to use web searches, a general Google, and white pages search. This ap-
proach was not fruitful for several reasons. There is no web yellow page
heading for auto title loans, few businesses have "auto title" in their names,
and most of the web pages returned were owned by a limited number of busi-
nesses, only one of which was located in Albuquerque. We wanted to limit
our survey to businesses that had at least one brick and mortar location in
Albuquerque, so that we could call an actual local location and visit it. The
sheer volume of items returned when we broadened our search to include all
"loans" frustrated our search.
We next turned to the 2010-11 DEX yellow pages. Again, the adver-
tisements had no heading for "Auto Title Loans" or "Title Loans," so we
broadened our search to "Loans." Although few businesses had "Auto Title"
in their name, loan companies appeared to have a lot of competition, and
many advertisements in the yellow pages listed title loans as one of the prod-
ucts offered. The yellow pages gave us an initial list of twelve businesses,
with a total of thirty-nine locations in Albuquerque. After calling these
twelve to interview them, we discovered that one did not offer title loans,
despite the Yellow Pages advertisement, which gave us a list of eleven busi-
nesses representing thirty-four separate locations.
101. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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We then began by driving up and down several large streets in Albu-
querque,102 looking for businesses advertising title loans. Our vehicle search
discovered an additional ten companies, bringing our list to a total of twenty-
one title loan companies representing sixty-six locations within the city limits
of Albuquerque. 0 3
After identifying the lenders, we turned to the FID database to identify
all small lenders who were authorized to make title loans in New Mexico as
of fall 2010.14 From this data, we compiled Appendix B, which shows twen-
ty lenders in fifty-eight locations authorized to make title loans.i' When
compared to Appendix A, one can see that not all of the lenders in our survey
were authorized to make title loans in New Mexico, nor were all of the li-
censed companies making title loans in New Mexico.106
Next, we called the businesses on our list, first asking if they offered ti-
tle loans and then asking for information about the loans. We were seeking
information on interest rates, fees charged, and the term of loans offered. We
also made notes during the calls as to the professionalism and demeanor of
the employees with whom we spoke. We asked for information on a loan of
$200. We made it clear that we were just getting information and were not
prepared to take out a loan at this time. If they insisted on having personal
information, we gave them a fictitious name, Brian Russell, and claimed to
have no home phone. If they asked for vehicle information in order to give us
a quote, we gave the information on a 1997 Ford F-150XL crew cab with a
short bed, a V6 engine, and an automatic transmission. We stated the truck
had about 250,000 miles on the odometer and was in "fair" condition, with a
Kelley Blue Book'o0 trade in value of about $950.00.
2. Results of the Title Lending Phone Survey
a. Annual Percentage Rate (APR)
One thing became apparent within the first few calls. Asking for the
APR of the loans was not helpful. Most of the employees with whom we
spoke were not able to convert the daily or monthly interest rate into an annu-
al percentage rate. Some knew only the daily rate. As title loans typically
have a monthly term, the interest rates that loan companies use are given as
102. The streets were Central Avenue (the old Route 66, and a major Albuquerque
thoroughfare), Juan Tabo Boulevard, Eubank, Menaul, and San Mateo.
103. See infra Appendix A.
104. See Facility Search, N.M. REG. & LICENSING DEP'T, http://rldverification.rld.
state.nm.us/ Verification/Search.aspx?facility-Y (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (search
results were obtained by selecting Profession: Financial Institutions and License
Type: small loan company).
105. See infra Appendix B.
106. See infra Appendix A.
107. See KELLEY BLUE BOOK, http://www.kbb.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).
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monthly or daily rates.108 While we report the APR here, we calculated these
from the monthly or daily percentage rate the employee of the lender provid-
ed. While employees of lenders sometimes provided us with an accurate
APR, this accuracy was the exception rather than the rule.
The lowest APR we found was a 0% introductory rate from Quick Cash
extended to first-time customers. Their normal annual interest rate is 300%.
The next lowest rate was 88% from Shamrock Finance,109 followed by 228%
at Checkmate."o We have some doubts about the reliability of these num-
bers. The first location we called refused to provide any interest rate, and the
employee at the second location said she thought the rate was "like 228% a
year,""' but hung up the phone before we could get clarification. The next
lowest annual percentage rate available in Albuquerque appears to be 240%,
which Money Train and New Mexico Title Loans offer.112 New Mexico Title
Loans offers this rate only on "new cars"; their regular rate is 360%.'1 3 Post-
survey, we learned that Lighthouse Financial regularly makes title loans at
148-160% per annum.114
The highest annual percentage rate recorded was 520%, from Check 'n
Go. The manager gave us this rate while trying to talk me into taking out a
260% installment loan instead. We found this conversation confusing at first,
but after further research, we surmised that not all of the Check-n-Go loca-
tions made title loans. We probably called a non-title loan location and, ra-
ther than refer our business elsewhere, the manager attempted to sell us an-
other product. As of this writing, we have not been able to confirm the APR
for this lender. Approved Finance also charged a rate of 520%, and the next
108. It is untrue that the APR is irrelevant for shorter term loans. First, not all
these loans are actually short term. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
Moreover, just because a person drives less than a mile does not mean miles per hour
is an irrelevant measure. Disclosure of the APR would at least in theory still allow
customers to compare the cost of credit between different providers.
109. See infra Appendix A. While Shamrock is a licensed small lender, and while
it makes title loans, it is not authorized by the New Mexico Financial Institutions
Division to make them. See Facility Search, N.M. REG. & LICENSING DEP'T,
http://rldverification.rld.state.nm.us/Verification/Search.aspx?facility-Y (search Fa-
cility Name: "Shamrock") (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (returning five results, none of
which is licensed to make title loans). Shamrock appears to have a complex system
of fees and interest rates that vary between 88% and 260%, depending on the amount
and term of the loan contract. See infra Appendix A. The employee we spoke with
was unwilling to explain how their system worked in detail. Telephone Interview
with Shamrock Finance Clerk (Oct. 16, 2011).
I10. See infra Appendix A.
111. Telephone interview with Checkmate Clerk (Oct. 17, 2011).
112. See infra Appendix A.
113. Mr. Adams saw this printed on a small sign attached to the counter while
visiting the New Mexico Title Loans location on Montgomery Boulevard.
114. See, e.g., Loan contract, supra note 2.
115. See infra Appendix A.
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highest APR was 450% from Ace Cash Express.' 16 The average APR from
our survey was 388%,' 17 which equals a monthly interest rate of 32.33%.
This figure was obtained by multiplying the number of locations of each title
lender by the interest rate offered, then dividing the sum by the total number
of title lenders in our survey."
b. Loan to Value Ratios
Title loans are deeply over-secured. In other words, the value of the col-
lateral used to secure the loan is far greater than the amount of the loan.
While some lenders claimed that they lend "up to 50% the value of your car,"
those rates are for new, highly desirable cars, which few people own outright.
Our phone survey data indicate that lenders typically lend between 25 and 40
% of a vehicle's value. In reality, even these values appear to be far higher
than what is loaned. Lenders calculate the percentage of the vehicle's value
to be loaned by looking at the wholesale, or trade-in value, of the car.
Wholesale values are significantly lower than the retail value. As an exam-
ple, the lender valued Ms. Price's car at $10,000. Its Kelley Blue Book value
at the time was $14,715, so the $4000 loan was 27.1% of the value of a rela-
tively new car.120 Other scholars have estimated the loan to retail value of the
vehicle to be 30%.121
Exact data on the loan to value ratio from each lender was impossible to
obtain. Clerks did not grasp the question and said it did not matter anyway.
They said all they do is put the information into the computer and the com-
puter tells them how much to lend.
c. Length of Loans
Our phone survey indicated that most loans are one month loans that can
be rolled over as many times as a customer wishes. Rollovers are what make
these loans so profitable for lenders and so harmful for borrowers. After
three rollovers, customers have paid as much in interest as they borrowed,
frequently without paying off any of the principal. There were a few lenders
in our survey who did not use this lending model. For example, American
Cash Loan gives fourteen-day loans, much like payday loans. Ace Cash Ex-
116. See infra Appendix A.
117. See infra Appendix A.
118. See infra Appendix A.
119. This figure can come from several different sources. See BLACK BOOK,
http://www.blackbookusa.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2011) (a subscription only ser-
vice); KELLEY BLUE BOOK, http://kbb.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2011); NATIONAL
AUTO DEALERS AssOCIATION, http://www.nada.org/ProductServices/NADAGuides
(last visited Oct. 12, 2011) ("yellow" or "orange" guides).
120. See Loan contract, supra note 2.
121. See Lundberg, supra note 15, at 191.
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press structures its loans as ten equal installments paid every two weeks for
five months, and Lighthouse Financial Services spreads its loan over eighteen
equal monthly payments. While all lenders claimed to charge "no fee for
early repayment," they define this clause ambiguously. The result of paying
off the loan early varies between charging a flat daily interest on the principal
borrowed until the loan is repaid, and repayment of all interest that would
have been owed if the loan was completed under the original agreement.
d. Fees
In addition to interest, nine of the twenty-one lenders surveyed charged
a "lien" fee, though few appear to record liens with the New Mexico Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Not surprisingly, the "lien" fees do not cor-
relate to the amount the DMV charges to file a lien.122
e. Income Requirements
Income requirements in the analyzed loans were lenient to non-existent.
Most lenders only require that the customer show some kind of income from
some source, including Social Security or student loans. Some lenders would
accept that you have a bank account with money in it. The Lighthouse Fi-
nancial branches with which we spoke did not require information about in-
come at all. The clerk with whom we spoke said point blank, "I don't care
about income. As long as you have a clean title, I will give you a loan."' 23
Only FastBucks requires a complete job history and proof of ability to repay
the loan. These data confirm that the auto title lending industry is an asset-
based business. Lenders rely on the vehicle for repayment, not the custom-
er's ability to pay. 124
122. The New Mexico Department of Motor Vehicles charges $5.00 to place a
lien on a car title. Telephone Interview with N.M. Dep't of Motor Vehicles Repre-
sentative (Dec. 5, 2011). Of the nine lenders who charge an additional fee, six are
simply passing along the $5.00 fee. Checkmate charges $8.00, and Money Train
charges $8.50. New Mexico Title Loans charges a fee of $19.50, which they still
refer to as the lien fee, but the fee is large enough to actually change the functional
interest on a short term loan. It should be kept in mind that the New Mexico Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles charges an additional $5.00 to issue a new "clear" title. Id.
123. Interview with Lighthouse Financial Clerk in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
October 17, 2010.
124. QUESTER & Fox, supra note 21, at 6 (stating that these loans are typically
made without regard to borrowers' ability to repay) ; Comments of the National Con-
sumer Law Center on Behalf of Its Low Income Clients Regarding Petition for Rule-
making to Preempt Certain State Laws Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
NAT'L CONSUMER L. CENTER, 13 (May 16, 2005), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
preemption/archive/fdic comments-05.pdf (stating that these "loans are typically
made without regard to borrowers' ability to repay").
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f. Demeanor
With only two exceptions, Checkmate and New Mexico Title Loans,
every title lender employee with whom we spoke was courteous and profes-
sional. Most employees were downright friendly. They did not act like they
were trying to trick us or hide relevant information, and when the monthly
and annual percentage rates did not add up, it seemed as though they made an
honest mistake. Compared to traditional banks, these lenders wanted our
business and went out of their way to be as helpful as possible. We feel cer-
tain that this enthusiasm is one of the reasons that people use title lenders and
use them often. As long as the customer is paying, the title lenders are pleas-
ant.
g. Ownership
Lenders argue that they should not be regulated because regulation will
hurt local (New Mexico) businesses.125 Our survey showed that of the sixty-
one authorized title lenders in Albuquerque, only four are incorporated in
New Mexico and owned by New Mexicans. Thus, most of their profits are
leaving the local economy.126
B. In-Store Survey of Title Loan Businesses in Albuquerque
In addition to these phone surveys, we visited ten stores at random in
order to see what the process of obtaining a loan would be and to determine if
the stores complied with signage laws. The signage law requires that all title
and payday loan companies display in each licensed place of business a
prominent sign, readily visible to borrowers, disclosing the schedule of
charges in twenty-four point font or larger.127 "The prominent sign in a re-
duced form, with font, no smaller than 10 point, must also be displayed at
every workstation where loans are originated."'
1 28
In 2002, New Mexico Public Interest Research Groups (NMPIRG) did a
statewide study of lender compliance with the signage and pamphlet provi-
sions.129 The study found that only one-third of the lenders were compliant
125. See INDUSTRY REPORT TO NEW MEXICO LEGISLATURE, supra note 9, at Re-
sources and Materials 29.
126. It is not possible to have access to the data collections since all data collected
or generated by the FID is protected by statute. All companies engaging in title loan
activities are required to obtain a small loan license. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-3
(West, Westlaw current through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 50th Legis. (2011)).
127. N.M. CODE R. § 12.18.4.8 (West, Westlaw current through all new rules,
amendments and appeals effective prior to Oct. 1, 2011).
128. Id.
129. See RAY PRUSHNOK, NMPIRG EDUCATION FUND PAYDAY HEYDAY!:
MEASURING GROWTH IN NEW MEXICO'S SMALL LOAN INDUSTRY 1990-2001 (2002),
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with the brochure and signage laws.130 In our ten visits, only one store was
compliant with both the pamphlet and signage regulations.
C. State Data from Title Loan Companies
As indicated above, the FID requires that all title lenders register with
the state and then report each year certain data about the loans they make to
the FID.131 This section reports on these industry-generated data. Given that
these data involve industry self-reporting, that some lenders make loans with-
out being registered, and that others do business without filing the reports, the
data will contain inaccuracies.132 Nevertheless, they provide useful insight
into the title lending business. The reports are due each year when the lender
applies to have its license renewed. The data are collected through a FID
questionnaire, and then the FID creates a report of all such data each year.133
We have summarized all of these annual reports and added line numbers so
that the data can be analyzed. Our summary of 2004-2008 is attached as Ap-
pendix C. The data for 2009 is attached as Appendix D.
One problem with the yearly summaries is that they average all of the
data, including obvious outliers.' 3 4 While knowing the mode or median in
addition to the mean would have been useful, having the raw data to work
with would have been ideal.' 35 A greater problem with the summaries is that
they do not contain many basic data points, such as the total number of loans
made for the year, the total number of customers served, the total principal
loaned, the average lien fees charged, and the average time customers took to
repay loans compared to original loan terms during the calendar year. We
have attempted to create these data points ourselves.
available at http://cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/qK5fOHMo87IR4-f64ibPw/
paydayheyday.pdf.
130. Id. at 6.
131. See N.M. CODE R. § 12.8.6.6, .8; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-3.
132. We have reported and analyzed various data from these reports in this Arti-
cle. See, e.g., Tables 1-4.1. We know, however, that the reports do not reflect the
entire industry in New Mexico, due to a failure of some lenders to make annual re-
ports and a failure of some lenders to become licensed. The reports also do not reflect
loans made by licensed companies who go out of business in the reporting year, be-
cause such lenders are not required to turn in an annual report. Moreover, it is unclear
whether companies that have made title loans for the reporting year, but do not intend
to continue making title loans, are required to complete the questionnaire.
133. According to the FID, a small loan examiner does an annual examination of
the licensed companies. Telephone Interview with Representative, supra note 110.
For any of the small loan companies to do title lending in New Mexico, they must get
approval from the Director of the FID, but it is not clear what is being examined. Id.
134. Since statistical outliers are not removed or accounted for before averaging,
the data is skewed for several line items.
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Below is the data from the five of the six years of summaries currently
available - 2004 through 2008.136 While the questions are consistent for each
year, the original summaries do not have line numbers. We have added line
numbers for easier reference. The first table beneath each numbered question
is the original data; the rest is our analysis. We have kept the numbers the
same as those numbers from the form, though the data at the end is in some
ways the most interesting.
The topics on which the data relate are as follows, for each of the five
calendar years: 1) the total dollar amount of all title loans originated, 2) the
total dollar amount of all title loans outstanding, 3) the total number of all
title loans outstanding 4) the total dollar amount of new title loans originated,
5) the annual percentage rate disclosed on all new title loans, 6) the number
of days until maturity for each loan originated, 7) the average number of new
title loans made to the same customer, 8) the number of times each title loan
was renewed, refinanced, or extended, 9) the number of title loans charged
off, 10) the dollar amount of title loans charged off, 11) the amount lenders
collected on past due accounts, 12) the gross yearly income disclosed by title
loan borrowers to lenders, 13) the number of borrowers sued by title lenders,
14) the total number of repossessions, 15) the total number of vehicles re-
claimed by the borrower after repossession but before sale of the vehicle, 16)
the total number of vehicles sold by the lender following repossession, 17)
the total amount of excess proceeds from sales of repossessed vehicles, re-
turned to borrowers, and finally, 18) the number of lenders reporting.
1. The Size of the Industry
This section assesses the size of the title loan industry in New Mexico.
As a point of reference, the state has a population of approximately
2,000,000.137 Its largest city, Albuquerque, has a population of approximate-
ly 535,000.138 The median income in the state, at the time of this writing, is
$34,585 for a single person, $46,907 for a family of two and $53,938 for a
family of four.1 39 Demographically, approximately 46% of the state identifies
136. See sources cited supra note 99. The report for 2009 became available dur-
ing the edit process, but given how few lenders actually reported, these data are not
useful. See N.M. FIN. INST. DIv., SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS (2009) [hereinafter
SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2009] (on file with authors); supra Table 18.1.
137. Dan McKay, N.M Hispanics Overtake Anglos, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL,
Mar. 16, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.abqjoumal.com/news/state/162346
134362newsstate03-16-1 .htm.
138. Albuquerque Quick Facts, ALBUQUERQUE - OFFICIAL CITY WEBSITE, http://
www.cabq.gov/econdev/whyabqquickfacts.htm (last visited on Oct. 16, 2011).
139. U.S. Trustee Program, U.S. DEP'T. JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/
bapcpa/20081001/bci data/edian income table.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
Moreover, income has been flat in the state. See Flat Income Relatively Good News
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as Hispanic, 41% Anglo or white, 8.5% Native American, and 1.7% African
American.140 It has the fifth largest population living below the poverty
linel41 and has the second largest percentage of homes that are mobile
homes. 142 These demographics and poverty levels make it likely that the
industry is larger per capita in New Mexico than in most other states.143 With
this backdrop, this section assesses the size of the industry in New Mexico.
a. Dollar Amount of all Title Loans Originated During the Calendar Year
The data on loan size was indeterminate. The data show that title loans
vary in size between $0 and $42,000 for the period in question.'" Also, if
zeroes are included in any averages, at least some of the results will be made
unreliable. In 2007, for example, at least one reporting lender claims to have
made a loan for $0 or no loans at all, and another lender made one loan for
$42,000. 145 As mentioned earlier, outliers like these make averaging mislead-
ing. 146
for NM, KRQE.coM, Oct. 1, 2010, http://www.krqe.com/dpp/news/business/flat-in
come-relatively-good-news-for-nm.
140. McKay, supra note 137.
141. Behind Mississippi, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Arkansas, according to 2008
Census Bureau data. Persons Living Below Poverty Level 2008, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/201 1/ranks/rank34.html (last visit-
ed Oct. 16, 2011).
142. Mobile Homes, Percent of Total Housing Units, 2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/ranks/rank38.html (last visited Oct.
16, 2011) (reporting on percentage of homes that are mobile homes in each state).
143. One set of data shows that New Mexico has the highest number of payday
lenders per capita of any U.S. state, and we are suggesting that the same may be true
of title lenders. Steven M. Graves, Think Payday Lending Isn't out of Control in the
United States?, CAL. ST. U., NORTHRIDGE, http://www.csun.edu/-sg4002/research/
mcdonalds _by state.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
144. See infra Table 1. We wondered, "What kind of a vehicle warrants a
$42,000 loan?" Assuming a loan at 40% of wholesale value, this vehicle would have
to be worth in excess of $105,000!
145. See SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2007, supra note 99; infra Table 1. We were
curious to know if the FID receives averages from the lenders, or whether it instead
receives an actual list of all title loans made for the year, which is then reduced to the
numbers in the report.
146. One can also question who would take out an auto title loan for $16, or $10.
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Table 1: Dollar Amount of Individual Loans Made
During the Calendar Year
b. Total Principal Dollar Amount of all Title Loans Outstanding
at End of Calendar Year
Table 2 reflects line two on the reporting form, which reports the total
principal amount outstanding on all loans as of the end of each reporting year,
as well as a per lender average.
Table 2: Total Principal Amount Outstanding on All Loans
at End of Calendar Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total
Principal





Per $54,473.30 $59,251.18 $73,799.22 $70,390.84 $105,335.35
Lender
Reporting
c. Total Number of all Title Loans Outstanding
at the end of the Calendar Year
Table 3 shows the total of all loans outstanding at the end of the year.
Again, end of year is not as useful as a yearly total, but it is a starting point
for making further calculations.
Table 3: Total of All Loans Outstanding at the End of the Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total No. Loans 19,271 14,993 13,902 15,098 13,740
Outstanding at Yr. End 1 1 1
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As a point of comparison, Tennessee also keeps data on title loans, as do
several other states. In 2006, Tennessee reported $40 million in outstanding
title loans, with 206 companies at 645 locations around the state. 147 The
number of loans extended was 92,489.148 Tennessee had an estimated popu-
lation of 6,038,803 at the time.14 9
d. Total Dollar Amount of New Title Loans Originated
During the Calendar Year.
Table 4: Total Principal for All Loans Originated
During the Calendar Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total
Principal
All $18,320,348.60 $14,108,143.91 $12,527,018.76 $12,059,283.47 $9,465,855.3!
Lenders
Reporting
We compared these numbers to the numbers in Table 2, the "Total Prin-
cipal Dollar Amount Outstanding on All Loans at End of Calendar Year" 50
to get the average size of each loan. We also took 365 days of the year divid-
ed by the average term from Table 6, and multiplied the result by the princi-
147. TENN. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE INDUSTRY: A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2006 REPORT TO THE TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7 (2007),
available at http:// www.tennessee.gov/tdfi/compliance/TPLSupplementalReport-
FINAL.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE INDUSTRY].
148. Id.
149. See List of Tennessee Counties by Population, GovREGISTRY.US, http://
www.govregistry.us/states/tennessee.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
150. Compare Table 2, with Table 4. Because these are allegedly short-term
loans, one would expect the total loans for the year to be much greater than the out-
standing loans at the end of the year. In fact, with loans of 30 days duration, on aver-
age, one would expect to see a total of loans for the year of approximately 12 times
greater than the loans outstanding at the end of the year. Other curiosities abound.
For example, how could the dollar amount of new title loans originated during the
calendar year decline by 100% over five years while the value of loans outstanding at
the end of each year remains fairly constant, and actually increases slightly? Com-
pare Table 2, with Table 4. Even more puzzling, it is impossible for the total of out-
standing loans at the end of 2008 to be only slightly less than the total dollar amount
of new title loans originated for the year. Compare Table 2, with Table 4. The 2008
Title loan Lenders Annual Summary Report indicates that 87 companies reported.
SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2008, supra note 99. It does not report the total number of
auto title lenders, so the percentage of title lenders that reported in 2008 cannot be
demonstrated by simply referring to the 2008 Annual Summary Report. See id.
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pal outstanding at the end of the year. This calculation helps us begin to cal-
culate the size of the title lending industry in New Mexico.
Table 4.1: Estimated Industry Profits Per Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total $ Lent
Per Yr. $18,320,348.60 $14,108,143.91 $12,527,018.76 $12,059,283.00 $9,465,855.35
Avg. APR 322.64 309.14 309.99 293.8 261.56
Avg. Daily
Interest Rate 0.883945205 0.846958904 0.849287671 0.804931507 0.71660274
Avg. Term 40 36.59 33.23 35.10 72.27
Min. Esti-








Profits $2,182,976,045 $1,731,369,707 $1,247,979,910 $1,134,571,223 $1,304,001,285
This Table illustrates that, assuming customers paid off their first loan
without defaulting or rolling over, at the very least, title lenders grossed over
$647 million in New Mexico in 2004. They grossed over $437 million in
2005, over $353 million in 2006, over $340 million in 2007, and over $490
million in 2008. These dollar values represent the minimum returns on in-
vestment that the lenders could have made under these assumptions, based
upon their own self-reporting, without taking into consideration any rollovers,
refinances, additional fees, or other charges. It is strictly the yearly amount
loaned times the average daily rate times the average term, as reported by the
lenders. The maximum numbers on the last line of Table 4.1 above suggest
that, when considering rollovers, these numbers could triple. We doubt that
these maximums are ever reached, given the inevitable defaults. On the other
hand, we believe that the minimum estimates above are too low and that in-
dustry claims that profits are low considering risk and default rates are
dubious.
2. The Interest Rate on the Loans
Interest rates on fringe banking products can be steep. Payday loans in
New Mexico and their new incarnation, the installment loan, frequently run
from 100% to 560%, and some interest rates are over 1 0 0 0 %.152 Many ob-
151. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 15, at 599-600.
152. Martin, supra note 16, at 606 n.211.
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servers think that an average rate for payday loans is around 500-600% 15' and
that title loans typically cost up to 300% per annum. 154 Our data from the
phone interviews, as well as through the state data reports, confirm these re-
sults.
Regulation Z of the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TWA) 55 requires
that lenders disclose all interest rates and fees. 1 56 "TILA was a prototype
consumer-protection statute and became the 'template' for most consumer-
credit legislation."i 5 7 It requires that lenders "disclose all of a contract's
terms and highlight, in a uniform way, critical terms like [APRs] and fees."
TILA governs the title lending industry as well. 15 9
Whether lenders reported the interest rate for all loans made, or whether
only their maximum and minimum loans were reported and then averaged by
the state, is unclear. Currently, the average title loan interest rate in Albu-
querque is 388%, and 300% is the most common interest rate, as reported
from the phone survey.160 The following chart illustrates the FID report data,
showing the average APR converted into a daily interest rate, which is then
multiplied by the average term from line six of the reports. By taking the
estimated principal amount loaned for the year and multiplying it by the func-
tional rate, we get an estimate of the return on the principal loaned for the
year. Despite less than half the principal being loaned in 2008, as compared
with 2006 and 2007, actual returns were very much the same.is6
153. See, e.g., PBS Newshour, What Will Financial Reform Mean for the Poorest?
(PBS television broadcast July 19, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.
org/newshour/bb/business/july-dec10/usabroke 07-19.html).
154. Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 443
155. See Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-67 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
156. See Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6, .17 (2011).
157. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 653 (2011).
158. Id. at 653-54.
159. See Pendleton v. Am. Title Brokers, 754 F. Supp. 860, 864-65 (S.D. Ala.
1991); Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1388.
160. See infra Appendix A. This illustrates, once again, how averaging outliers
can skew results. This is the functional interest rate, or the one the customer actually
pays on their loan, based on the number of days the loan is outstanding, as well as the
rate of return the lender will make on his investment of capital or principal.
161. Some of the numbers reported seem impossible, such as an annual interest
rate of 10,250.66%, or of 9,125.00%. SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2005, supra note
99; SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANs 2004, supra note 99. Our data simply reflects the
reality that one lender has reported these interest rates shown. Keep in mind that even
the numbers that appear more plausible reflect only an estimate of the return on prin-
cipal loaned, not profits. This figure does not take into account any additional fees,
rollovers, or refinances, all which will increase the amount collected, nor does it take
into account lender expenses.
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Table 5: Minimum, Maximum, and Average APRs Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Min. APR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Max. APR 10,250.66% 9125.00% 2281.00% 689.00% 630.00%
Avg. APR 322.64% 309.14% 309.99% 293.80% 261.56%
Table 5.1: Daily Interest Rates (Avg. APR/365)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Avg. APR 322.64% 309.14% 309.99% 293.80% 261.56%
DailyDie R 0.88% 0.85% 0.85% 0.80% 0.72%
Interest Rate
3. The Length of the Loans
The common lore is that title loans have an initial one-month term.162
While thirty days was the most common loan period, some loans were for
longer or shorter periods. Table 6 reflects the number of days for which each
loan was taken. The low end does not make sense, because some lenders
report making loans for zero days or one day. The high end is more helpful,
though alarming. At the long end, loans range from 1095 days in 2008 to 730
days in 2004, with the range for the other years falling somewhere in be-
tween.163 These longest terms are startling. If these were three-year loans
with an APR of 300% or more, the borrowers could have paid $10,000 to
borrow $1000. Disturbingly, the initial loan term more than doubled between
2007 and 2008, from thirty-five days to seventy-two days, frequently at an
effective interest rate of 300% or more.164
Table 6: Number of Days for the Initial Maturity Term on New Loans
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Min. Length of Loan I I 1 0 0
Reported
Max. LengthofLoan 730 900 910 970 1095
Reported
Avg. Length of Loan 40 36.59 33.23 35.10 72.27
Reported I I 1 11
162. See Burt et al., supra note 15, at 367.
163. See SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2008, supra note 99; SUMMARY OF TITLE
LOANs 2004, supra note 99.
164. See SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2008, supra note 99; SUMMARY OF TITLE
LOANs 2007, supra note 99.
2012] 71
31
Martin and Adams: Martin: Grand Theft Auto Loans
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
4. Lather, Rinse, and Repeat: Are the Loans Frequently Renewed?
This section discusses whether borrowers use these loans frequently or
infrequently. Lenders claim these loans are money sources of last resort and
are necessary to help consumers in emergencies.' Consumer groups insist
that consumers frequently use these loans for regular or even luxury purchas-
es, after which consumers are in a more dire financial situation than before.
The data below describe the average number of loans per customer in New
Mexico for the years in question, as well as the average times that borrowers
roll over or renew their original loans. Together, these two sets of statistics
paint a grim picture of almost constant indebtedness for consumers who use
these loans.
a. Average Number of New Title Loans Made to the Same Customer
Originated During Calendar Year
Table 7 reflects the number of loans made to individual customers in
one year. This table refutes industry claims that these loans are used infre-
quently for emergencies by showing that the average customer takes out
165. Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 431-32. While Professor Zywicki is not
himself a lender, his work is the go-to source for title lenders when reporting official
data. See Hearing on S.B. 251, S.B. 253, and S.B. 254 Before the Tex. Senate Com-
mittee on Business & Commerce, 82nd Reg. Sess. (2011) (testimony of Robert Reich,
President of Tex. Car Title Loan Servs. and Cmty. Loans of Am.).
166. For industry claims, see Gregory Elliehausen & Edward C. Lawrence, Pay-
day Advance Credit in America: An Analysis of Customer Demand 47 (Credit Re-
search Ctr., McDonough Sch. of Bus., Georgetown Univ., Monograph #35, 2001)
available at http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/Mono35.pdf (stating that 65.7 % of
borrowers use the payday loans for "emergencies," 11.9 % for "planned expenses,"
and 22.5 % for "other" discretionary uses); Todd J. Zywicki, Consumer Welfare and
the Regulation of Title Pledge Lending 12 , 31-32 (Mercatus Center, George Mason
Univ., Working Paper No. 09-36, 2009), available at http://mercatus.org/publication/
consumer-welfare-and-regulation-title-pledge-lending (claiming that "studies of simi-
lar products [like payday loans show] that consumers generally use nontraditional
lending products to address short term needs for cash and to meet emergencies"). For
consumer groups and one scholar claiming that the loans are not used primarily for
emergencies, see QUESTER & Fox, supra note 21, at 2 (staing that "like payday loans,
car title loans are marketed as small emergency loans, but in reality these loans trap
borrowers in a cycle of debt"); Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Busi-
ness of Auto Title Lending, 4-5 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (manu-
script at 5) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1952084) (stating that according to
an FDIC source, 14.2-29.6% of people use title loans for emergencies, and 38% use
them for regular expenses).
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between 3.15 and 5 loans per year, not taking into account any rollovers. 167if
the average customer is taking out three to five title loans a year, one won-
ders how many times the frequent users make these loans. Could it be that
most of the time a customer has one of these loans out? These data suggest a
serious debt cycle on the part of consumers, rather than an occasional use for
emergencies only. Consumers caught in such a debt cycle also are least likely
to be able to afford these loans.
Table 7: Average Number of New Loans Per Customer
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Avg. No. of Separate Loans Per 5 3.9 4.4 3.22 3.15Customer
These data allow us to estimate the number of loans made per year by
dividing the amount of principal from Table 4 by the average loan amount
from Table 1. The number of customers who use title loans in a given year
can be estimated by dividing the result by the average from Table 7. Appar-
ently, between 22,000 and 38,289 people use these products per year in New
Mexico. Note the drastic drop in the number of customers in 2008.
167. The advertising also belies that the loans are used, or intended to be used, for
emergencies only. For example, a company called Cupertino Title Loans tells this
story of a "customer" in order to sell loans:
Cupertino Title Loans helped me with an auto title loan when I really
needed one a few weeks ago to help with my bills. I just got back from a
crazy bachelor party in Las Vegas for one of my oldest friends from high
school at the end of last month. I ended up spending too much money that
[sic] my budget allowed, and I didn't have enough money for my end of
the month bills when I got back home. I needed help paying my bills so
that I could afford it later on . . . . I decided that a car title loan from Cu-
pertino Title Loans would be the best decision for me. I got approved for
my title loan on their website http://www.cupertinotitleloans.com thanks
to their online help agents. Then I just had to go to Cupertino Title Loans
to pick up my title loan whenever I was ready. I went that afternoon, and
sure enough they had a check for my pink slip loan, and was able to keep
my car too. They just kept my car's title for collateral, so that I could
keep my car while I have the loan.
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Table 7.1: Estimated Number of Title Loan Customers Per Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Lent $18,320,348.60 $14,108,143.91 $12,527,018.76 $12,059,283 $9,465,855.35
Avg. Loan
Amount $529.91 $507.31 $544.16 $648.23 $753.31
Avg. No.
of Loans 34,572 27,809 23,020 18,603 12,565
Avg.
Loans Per
Customer 5 3.9 4.4 3.22 3.15
Est. No.
of Cus-
tomers 6914 7130 5231 5777 3988
b. Number of Times any Title Loan was Renewed, Refinanced, or Extended
During the Calendar Year
Table 8 indicates the average number of rollovers on existing loans,
which ranges from 2.66 to 3.53. This average suggests a high rate of rollo-
vers, renewals, or refinances, and is further evidence that customers are una-
ble to pay off the loans and thus frequently pay interest only, especially when
combined with the data in Table 7.1. These data suggest that on average, title
loan users take out 3.9 loans 68 and renew on average 3.3 times. Or, if all
loans were one month old, these people have the loans out twelve months out
of twelve months.169 We know not all loans are a full month long. Neverthe-
less, customers who use these products appear to use them frequently and
repetitively. It seems that the product design of title loans makes it more
likely that they create a debt cycle than even payday loans at higher interest.
This situation occurs because title loans are larger, and the ability to pay back
the whole loan is smaller.
Table 8: Average Number of Rollovers Per Loan
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Min. No. of Renewals 0 0 0 0 0
Max. No. of Renewals 32 75 120 78 39
Avg. No. of Renewals 3.37 3.96 3.53 3.33 2.66
168. This number was arrived at by averaging the rate for all five years and is thus
not 100% accurate, as it would over count the rate in years in which there were more
loans and undercount the rate for years in which there were fewer loans.
169. This actually comes out to 12.87, or more than all of the year. Since we do
not know the length of a given extension, we cannot use this number to calculate
anything further, but these data alone are indicative of a significant debt cycle.
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5. Profits and Losses, Winners and Losers
a. Number of Title Loans Charged off During the Calendar Year
Table 9 records the number of charged-off loans in each year.170
Table 9: Total Number of Charged-off Loans Per Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total No. of Loans Charged Off 3808 6391 3925 33
Per Year
b. Dollar Amount of Title Loans Charged off During the Year
Table 10 reflects the dollar amount of all loans charged off. This num-
ber is not, however, an actual loss of capital. Looking at the renewal rates
from Table 8, we see that borrowers often refinance and continue to pay on
their loans far past the original term. These payments exceed the principal
amount of the loan, generating a profit for the lender without reducing the
amount owed.171
Table 10: Dollar Amount of Loans Charged off Per Year




oa All $1,556,397.45 $1,827,509.32 $2,180,380.92 $1,896,165.59 $1,481,212.97Loans
Charged
Off
170. The phrase "charged-off loans" does not mean that the lender has given up
trying to collect on the loan. This is simply the number of loans that were written off
the books as a loss at the end of the year. This number includes past due loans in the
active collections process and those on which the lender has stopped collecting at the
moment. This does not mean that the lender has given up, of course; he or she can
and does continue to attempt to collect for up to six years, and interest continues to
accrue and can be written off as a loss for tax purposes by the lender. Moreover,
these debts can be sold to debt collectors.
171. The potential profit that the lender would make is what is written off if the
customer paid the interest due, meaning principal and interests, not just what was
borrowed. All of this potential profit, which continues to grow every day a borrower
does not make any payments, is considered a loss for tax purposes. Moreover, inter-
est continues to accrue, even after a loan is charged off for tax purposes.
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c. Dollar Amount of Recoveries on Title Loans During the Calendar Year
Table 11 reflects the total amount that lenders reported they collected on
past due accounts charged off in previous years, further demonstrating that
write-offs do not reflect losses.
Table 11: Amounts Collected on Charged-off Debts










Table 12 reflects the minimum and maximum gross income for all bor-
rowers, as disclosed by the lenders.
Table 12: Minimum and Maximum Gross Income for all
Borrowers Reported On
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Min. Gross
Income of $500.00 $0.00 $10.00 $0.00 $0.00
Borrowers
Max. Gross
Income of $619,944.00 $439,000.92 $576,000.00 $2,080,000.00 $730,000.00
Borrowers
Avg. Gross
Income of $21,962.73 $22,861.78 $24,678.65 $27,719.36 $20,116.00
Borrowers
These income data show an income range of borrowers from zero in-
come to $2,080,000. If we assume that the reported numbers are the average
of all reported income, outliers will affect the result, (for instance, $0 and $2
million). Thus, these data seem questionable and raise a number of questions,
including why someone with such a large income would use such overpriced
credit products, or why a lender would make a loan to someone without in-
come.
Perhaps these data suggest that if the data does not matter to the lender,
recording it accurately is not a priority. The law does not require lenders to
get proof of income from borrowers, nor do their own underwriting rules
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seem to warrant doing so.1 72 Also, the yearly averages are not representative
of the population, because some data points, such as an income of
$2,080.000, skew the entire database for that year. Regardless, this data set is
all that is available so we will take it at face value. In Table 12.1 below, we
compare the averages for each year to the Federal Health and Human Re-
sources Poverty Guidelines for a family of four.
Table 12.1: Comparison of Borrower Income to
Federal Poverty Guidelines
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Avg. Gross
Incomeof $21,962.73 $22,861.78 $24,678.65 $27,719.36 $20,116.00Title Loan
Borrowers
Poverty
Line o $18,850.00'7 $19,350.00" $20,000.0017 $20,650.00fr $21,200.001
Family of ~ 1930g7 2,0.0' $0600I6 $1200"
4
While the industry and its proponents claim that a majority of their cus-
tomers are middle class, 7 8 the data tell a different story in New Mexico. We
see that most borrowers are near or below the poverty line. This data applies
for all years except for 2007, where one customer reporting an income of over
two million dollars skewed the data.17 9
In Table 12.2 below, we compare the average gross income of borrow-
ers to the median incomes of families of all sizes in New Mexico.' 8 0
172. The alleged "income requirements," if you can call them that, vary greatly
between lenders. Some require proof of regular employment, some will accommo-
date part-time or irregular employment, some will accept student loans and social
security (which are not "income" for tax purposes), some will accept that the borrow-
er has money in the bank, and some will make loans simply against the value of the
vehicle, with no concern for income. Since income information is not used in making
the loan, these numbers may be unreliable.
173. The 2004 HHS Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/04poverty.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
174. The 2005 HHS Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/05poverty.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
175. The 2006 HHS Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
176. The 2007 HHS Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/07poverty.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
177. The 2008 HHS Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUM.
SERVICES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/08poverty.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
178. See Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 435.
179. See SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2007, supra note 99.
180. This information was gathered from the United States Trustee's median in-
comes data, used for means test purposes in bankruptcy cases. Census Bureau, IRS
Data and Administrative Expenses Multipliers, U.S. DEP'T. JUST., http://wwwjustice.
2012] 77
37
Martin and Adams: Martin: Grand Theft Auto Loans
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
Table 12.2: Comparison of Average Gross Income of Borrowers to the
Median Incomes of Families of All Sizes in New Mexico18 1
2005 2006 2007 2008
Avg. Gross Income
of Title Loan $22,861.00 $24,678.65 $27,719.36 $20,116.00
Borrowers
Median Income for
Family of One in $38, 947.00 $40,028.00 $44,356,.00 $42,102.00
New Mexico
As Table 12.2 shows, compared to families of all sizes in New Mexico,
the average incomes of all title loan customers is far below the median or
average income of the rest of the state.
7. Lawsuits and Repossessions
Both Professor Todd Zywicki and, to some extent, Professor Jim Haw-
kins claim that lenders usually do not repossess the vehicles pledged as col-
lateral for title loans.182 Whether this claim is correct or not depends upon the
meaning of the word "usually." Data obtained from the self-reported records
show that between 20% and 71% of the title loan customers have their vehi-
cles repossessed.183 Once reclamation rates are taken into account, between
13% and 60% of customers permanently lose their vehicles.184
a. Number of Individual Title Loan Borrowers Against
whom Lawsuits were Instituted
Table 13 reports on borrowers sued by their title lenders in connection
with their title loans. While these data show that lenders infrequently utilize
lawsuits, there is no indication that in New Mexico the loans are non-
recourse. In the dozen or so contracts that we have seen, all allow the lender
185
to sue for deficiencies, and some lenders do so.
gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/meanstesting.htm (use dropdown for Data Required for Complet-
ing Form 22A and Form 22C by date) (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
181. See Median Household Income by State - Single-Year Estimates, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/statemedian/.
182. See Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1392-93; Consumer Use, supra note 8, at
435.
183. See sources cited supra note 99; infra Table 14.2.
184. See sources cited supra note 99; infra Table 15.1.
185. See infra Table 13. Additionally, as we understand it, interest will still ac-
crue at the contract rate on any balance owed. If a judgment is reached in favor of the
borrower, the court has discretion to set a new interest rate, or to allow the contract
rate to remain in effect. We speculate that one reason that lenders seldom take bor-
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Table 13: Number of Suits Against Borrowers for Deficiencies
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total No. of Suits Filed by 113 151 15 167
Lenders Against Borrowers
b. Total Number of Title Loan Repossessions During the Calendar Year
Table 14 reflects the total number of repossessions reported each year.
Despite the fact that the number of loans made has decreased recently, the
number of repossessions has increased.
Table 14: Total Number of Repossessions Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total No. of Repossessions Per 1984 1441 2779 2745 2841
Yr.
If we divide the number of reported repossessions for a given year by
the number of loans made that year, we get the percentage of loans repos-
sessed for the year.
Table 14.1: Repossession Rate by Loan
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Lent $18,320,348.60 $14,108,143.91 $12,527,018.76 $12,059,283.47 $9,465,855.35
Avg. Loan
Amt. $529.91 $507.31 $544.16 $648.23 $753.31
Avg. No. of
Loans 34572 27809 23020 18603 12565
Total Repos-
sessions 1984 1441 2779 2745 2841
% of Loans
Repossessed 5.74% 5.18% 12.07% 14.76% 22.61%
While these rates are higher than we contemplated, they do not paint a
complete picture. We must go further and divide the number of repossessions
per year by the estimated number of customers we calculated in Table 7.1.
This calculation provides an estimate of the yearly repossession rate per cus-
tomer.
rowers to court is that is in their best interest not to allow the courts the chance to find
their interest rates legally unconscionable.
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Table 14.2: Repossession Rate by Customer
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Avg. No. of Loans
Per Yr. 34572 27809 23020 18603 12565
Avg. New Loans Per
Customer Per Yr. 5 3.9 4.4 3.22 3.15
Total No. of Cus-
tomers 6914 7130 5231 5777 3988
Total Repossessions 1984 1441 2779 2745 2841
% of Customers with
Vehicles
Repossessed 28.70% 20.21% 53.13% 47.52% 71.24%
As Table 14.2 shows, once we adjust the numbers to reflect the number
of loans per customer, we find that the actual number of customers who get
their cars repossessed jumps alarmingly. For example, in 2006, 53% of cus-
tomers had their autos repossessed. To illustrate the magnitude of this repos-
session rate, we compare this rate to the current home foreclosure rate. In the
fourth quarter of 2008 Nevada led the nation with a foreclosure rate between
2.574% and 4%, described by the New York Times as "dangerously wide-
spread."1 86 If that foreclosure rate is a crisis, what is 53%? Not only is a
vehicle repossession a loss of a major asset, it is the loss of vital transporta-
tion.
Table 15: Number of Reclamations by Borrowers after Repossession
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Reclamations 1972 15111 6331 6081 446
Table 15.1: Vehicle Loss Rate by Customer
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Reclamations 972 511 633 608 446
Percentage of Loans 48.99% 35.46% 22.78% 22.15% 15.70%
Number of Autos Lost 1012 930 2146 2137 2395
% of Customers Who Lost Vehicles 14.64% 13.04% 41.02% 36.99% 60.06%
186. Catherine Rampell, Foreclosure Rates Really Aren't that High . ., N.Y.
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To say an auto is repossessed does not mean that it was lost permanent-
ly, only that a customer fell behind in the payments and the repossession pro-
cess was at least started. This is reflected in Table 15, which shows the num-
ber of customers who reclaimed their autos after repossession. To find out
how many customers actually lost their vehicles after repossession, we sub-
tract the number of customers who reclaimed their autos after repossession, as
shown in Table 15, from the number of repossessions. We divided the num-
ber of autos lost by the total number of customers, as calculated in Table
14.2. These numbers show actual loss rates of 14.64% for 2004, 13.04% for
2005, 41.02% for 2006, 36.99% for 2007, and 60.06% for 2008. These fig-
ures are alarming under any standard.
c. Total Number of Motor Vehicles Disposed of by the Lender
During the Calendar Year
Table 16 reflects the total number of motor vehicles sold after reposses-
sion by the lender during the calendar year. This number should equal the
Number of Autos Lost found in Table 15.1, which is calculated by subtracting
the Number of Repossessions Reported from Table 14 from the Number of
Reclamations by Borrowers After Repossession from Table 15. For some
unknown reasons, it does not. This may be the result of vehicles being repos-
sessed in one year and disposed of in another, but without more detailed data
this is impossible to confirm.
Table 16: Total Number of Motor Vehicles Disposed of by the Lender
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total No. of Repossessed Cars
Disposed of by Lender During 833 745 1277 1237 1325
Calendar Yr.
d. Total Dollar Amount of Title Loan Excess Proceeds from Sale of Repos-
sessed Vehicles Returned to the Borrowers During the Calendar Year
Table 17 reflects the difference in the selling price of repossessed vehi-
cles as compared to how much the borrowers owe, or the total amount that all
vehicle sales proceeds exceeded all loan amounts. New Mexico law requires
lenders to return these overages to the borrower.1
187. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-615(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through the Ist Reg.
Sess. of the 50th Legis. (2011)).
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of Sales Price of Repossessed Cars to Amount of








Below, we divided the amounts in Table 17 by the number of disposed
vehicles to determine an estimate of the amount returned to the average cus-
tomer. Surely some vehicles sell for more than the average and others sell for
amounts insufficient to cover the outstanding loan. The data above indicate
that the average amount returned is small and getting smaller every year.
Since the lenders have to return any overage, the lenders are not motivated to
sell vehicles for any more than they are owed. It is most economical for
them to sell the vehicles as quickly as possible, as shown in table 17.1.
Table 17.1: Average Amount Returned to Each Borrower Following Sale
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Amt.
Realized in













EachBroe $67.51 $47.19 $52.38 $29.25 $12.06Borrower
Following
Sale
188. We recognize that in some cases, vehicles may have actually sold at a loss to
the lender, but would imagine that those are somewhat rare instances, given that loans
are generally made at 25-40% of wholesale value.
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8. Reporting Woes
One theme quickly developed while analyzing these data. Lenders do
not report and there are no ramifications. They do not lose their licenses or
suffer any other consequences in response to their inaccurate reporting. We
hope our paper will bring attention to and help remedy these practices. Table
18 shows a 32% decrease in lenders reporting between 2007 and 2008.189 We
carefully searched the New Mexico Regulation and Licensing Database for a
count of all licensed small lenders authorized to make title loans from 2004 to
2008, data which is reflected in Table 18.1.
Table 18: Number of Licensees Reporting
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total Small Lenders
Authorized to Make 148 143 116 128 87
Title Loans who
Reported to the FID
Table 18.1 Percentage comparison of lenders who filed reports to lend-
ers authorized to make title loans.
Table 18.1 Number of Licensed Lenders Filing Reports
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
No. of Lenders
Reporting 148 143 116 128 87 65
No. of Lenders
Licensed 157 155 145 137 138 165
% of Licensed
Lenders
Reporting 94.27% 92.26% 80.00% 93.43% 63.04% 39.39%
As the table above shows, in 2004, 94.27% of lenders responded, but in
2009 only about 40% of title lenders completed their FID required question-
naires. FID apparently has all but stopped enforcing its reporting require-
ments. Given what was reported, pursuant to N.M. Statutes Annotated § 58-
15-10.11D(2), there should have been forty-eight more expired or revoked
licenses in 2009.190 In summary, while the reporting has never been perfect,
189. See SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANs 2008, supra note 99; SUMMARY OF TITLE
LOANS 2007, supra note 99.
190. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-10.1D. There have been numerous violations
of the requirement that small lenders be authorized by the FID before making title
loans. Under TILA, small loan companies are also required to disclose all fees and
interest rates to the consumer in terms of APR, but it is not clear that this is being
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the situation seems to be getting worse each year except for 2007, with no
explanation for the drop. In 2008, the percentage of lenders reporting was
abysmal. By 2009, fewer than half the lenders complied with the reporting
requirements.192 This lack of compliance makes the 2009 data all but worth-
less.
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT TITLE LOAN CUSTOMERS,
REPOSSESSION RATES, AND THE UTILITY OF THESE LOANS
This Part draws various conclusions about title lending from the data
discussed in Part Ill above. In so doing, it challenges many of the myths
about title lending. It discusses the demographics of title loan customers, the
repossession rates on title loans, the legal implications of the data on surplus
returns to customers, and finally, the utility of these loans to borrowers. This
utility is discussed in the context of other loan products such as payday loans,
as well as in light of industry claims that title loans smooth consumption for
low-end borrowers with little access to other credit.
A. Title Loan Demographics: Who Uses Them?
Payday lenders have been claiming for years that they serve a primarily
middle class population.193 Some industry scholars have made this claim,
ever since a 2001 industry-funded study found that most payday customers
make between $25,000 and $50,000.194 This claim is critical to the payday
lending industry's assertion that it does not take advantage of the poor.'
done. See Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6, .17 (2011). This lack
of enforcement on the part of the FID has been an issue for as long as the FID has
been responsible for monitoring title lenders, as indicated above in the section on
compliance with signage laws. See supra Part II.2.B.
191. See SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2008, supra note 99.
192. SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS 2009, supra note 136.
193. See Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 458-59 & n.141.
194. Elliehausen, supra note 24, at 19.
195. For a few of the many statements made on payday lending websites, see
Payday Loan Myths, USPAYDAYCENTER, http://uspaydaycenter.com/payday-loan-
myths (last visited Dec. 11, 2011) (stating that "most people receiving such loans
make between $25,000 and $50,000 a year"); Your OnLine Payday Center, PCA
PERSONAL CASH ADVANCE, http://www.personalcashadvance.com/payday-loans.html
(last visited on December 11, 2011) (stating that it is "debunking" payday loan myths
and that "[m]ost cash advance borrowers earn $25,000-$50,000 annually"); see also
Dick Hughes, Advance America Banks on Surprise, JOURNAL WATCHDOG, (Oct. 30,
2011, 8:18 PM), http://www.joumalwatchdog.com/business/ 1290-advance-america-
banks-on-surprise (quoting an industry study as saying that "[t]he Community Finan-
cial Services Association (CFSA), which represents payday lenders, cites research
showing that two-thirds of payday customers are under 45, 41 percent earn $25,000-
$50,000 and 39 percent more than $40,000"); Larry Meyers, Payday Loans v. In-
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Lenders repeat this assertion over and over again, though never with any sup-
porting data other than that created by the industry.196
The title lending industry has been far less vocal on this subject, but it
still relies on faulty data to conclude that, based upon a New Mexico "study,"
title loan borrowers make on average $50,000 a year. 197 Our data, reported
directly by lenders to the State of New Mexico Financial Institutions Divi-
sion, prove otherwise. Our data show that the average borrower makes be-
tween $20,116 and $27,719, even when you include in the one borrower with
an alleged income of over two million dollars.198 This data is in a state where
the median income for even a single person household is far above any of
these income numbers. Data from other states similarly show gross incomes
between $22,000 and $26,000.'99 Finally we can discard this middle class
urban legend.
B. Repossession Rate: Another National Financial Crisis
Table 14.2 shows a repossession rate of between 20% and 71% per cus-
tomer.200 Once reclamation rates are taken into account, between 13% and
20160% of customers permanently lose their vehicles. Other states report the
following repossession rates: 10% for South Carolina,202 and 9% for Tennes-
see. 203 These rates appear to be as much as ten times higher than the reposses-
stallment Loans, PAYDAYLOAN FACTS BLOG (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.paydayloan
facts.com/blog/credit-options/payday-loans-vs-installment-loa ns/ (stating that 63% of
payday loan borrowers "have annual household incomes of more than $25,000, with
46% earning $25,000 to $50,000 a year").
196. In the context of title lending, see all three of Zywicki's articles. See gener-
ally Consumer Use, supra note 8; Money to Go, supra note 17; Zywicki & Okolski,
supra note 17; see also INDUSTRY REPORT TO NEW MEXICO LEGISLATURE, supra note
17, at Resources and Materials 25-49.
197. See Money to Go, supra note 17, at 34.
198. See supra Tables 12-12.1.
199. According to Illinois data from 1999, the average title loan consumer has an
income of less than $20,000, and in Missouri, less than $25,000, as of 2006. See Fox
& Guy, supra note 21, at 3.
200. Numerically, based upon Table 14.2, this is between 1400 and 2800 repos-
sessions per year. We suspect that the rate is even higher, but assuming this self-
reported data is correct, the rate is still very significant.
201. See supra Tables 15-15.1. Keep in mind that the 2008 reporting rate was so
low as to call these 2008 figures into serious question.
202. See also DeGaris, supra note 15, at 1839 (reporting on South Carolina).
203. In Tennessee, 14,832 cars were repossessed in 2008 while 161,417 loans
were originated, giving us an estimated 9% repossession rate. The 2010 Report on the
Title Pledge Industry, Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions (March 2010).
2012] 85
45
Martin and Adams: Martin: Grand Theft Auto Loans
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW
sion rate for regular auto loans.204 While we realize that one could quibble
with the results of a calculation that divides the average of two variables to
reach a third average,205 by any measure, this number represents a significant
percentage of lost vehicles. Moreover, this rate is dozens of times higher than
the current home foreclosure rate nationwide, which many consider to be a
nationwide emergency and tragedy of nearly unprecedented proportion. Title
loans are the secured auto loan equivalent of a home mortgage. Both types of
loans lead to the loss of a significant asset for the person involved. Both
forms of loss lead to displacement, and in the case of loss of a vehicle, an
inability to function in the modem world.206
Also, building on the past section on demographics, for the borrowers
involved, a vehicle likely is the most valuable asset they have. Though we
have no actual data to support this, we believe they are unlikely to be home-
owners as a general rule. Having an unencumbered vehicle is an important
feat to most borrowers, and subsequent loss of that car is as much of an im-
portant negative financial event to these borrowers as losing a home has to
the more affluent borrower. This reality is particularly true given that all of
the repossessed cars would appear to have equity, and many of the foreclosed
homes do not. The loss of these vehicles is indeed a forfeiture.
C Article 9 and Title Loans: The Ultimate Contradiction
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to title loans and re-
quires that once a lender has repossessed collateral, the lender must give no-
tice to the owner and then sell the collateral in a commercially reasonable
way. 207 Following such a sale, the lender must return to the borrower any
208
surplus from sale, over and above the loan amount and the costs of sale.
204. See, e.g., Joseph B. Cahill, License to Owe, Title Loan Firms Offer Car
Owners a Solution that Often Backfires, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 1999, at Al (stating the
general rate of repossession at General Motors is one to two percent).
205. Professor Hawkins has noted when reviewing these data that calculating the
numbers in this way leads to error. Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1392 n.173. We
acknowledge at note 146, supra, that the problem with the yearly summaries is that
they average all of the data, including obvious outliers. Professor Hawkins notes that
this creates unknown error rates in each original average. See Hawkins, supra note
15, at 1392 n.173. Once two such averages are combined to perform a calculation,
the error rate is compounded. We also perform our computations under the assump-
tion that dividing the averages of two variables results in a third average - the average
of the divided variables, which is not true. Unfortunately, given the lack of backup
data, we have no choice. This does not change the fact that even at their lowest, these
repossession rates are astronomical.
206. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 15, at 600.
207. See U.C.C. §§ 9-608-14 (2010). The law also requires that, in some cases,
the lender advertise the sale in the newspaper. Id.
208. Id § 9-615.
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The point of these provisions, which form the bedrock of the Article 9 reme-
dies, is to avoid a forfeiture of borrower property at the hands of lenders. In
essence, Article 9 forbids such forfeiture.209
We know from our phone interviews and from data other scholars have
collected that lenders loan at somewhere between 20 and 55% of a vehicle's
value. 2 10 We know from the self-reported data that lenders return somewhere
between $12 and $68 in surplus per loan to customers. 211 So where is the rest
of the value in these vehicles? Case law suggests that a sale is commercially
reasonable if all of the notice requirements of Article 9 are met and the lend-
er's sale brings between 57 and 70% of the fair market value of the collat-
eral.212 How can lenders be so over-secured but return so little surplus to
foreclosed borrowers? Is it that lenders do not hold commercially reasonable
sales? Is it that they sell back to themselves, or to a sister corporation, then
resell the cars on the adjoining lot through a private sale that does not comply
with Article 9? Is it that lenders do not, even by their own admission, return
the surplus to borrowers? Or, is it that lenders wait to sell following repos-
session until the fees have increased enough to eat up whatever equity there
was? All of these questions need to be explored in further research, but if
lenders are accomplishing forfeiture by waiting to sell until the fees have
eaten up the equity, there would be far more significant implications than
anything else reported in this piece. The implication is that Article 9 provi-
sions to prevent forfeitures of collateral do not work on secured personal
property loans with interest rates this high. Article 9's anti-forfeiture provi-
sions are insufficient to achieve their anti-forfeiture goal in the case of title
loans.
D. Strictly Asset-Based Lending Leads to More Forfeiture
When a lender makes a loan based exclusively on the value of the col-
lateral underlying the loan, rather than also on ability to repay, forfeiture is
more likely. This fact is well-recognized in the commercial as well as the
consumer context.213 When your target population for a consumer product
also has low income and low cash flow, the loans are likely to lead to forfei-
209. See Michael Korybut, Searching for Commercial Reasonableness, 87 IowA
L. REV. 1383, 1395 (2002).
210. Fox & GUY, supra note 21, at 2 (noting the "most frequent loan-to-value set
at 50 to 55 percent of the car's value"). We believe that some title lenders appraise
the car at the lowest possible value (the wholesale price in bad condition) and then
offer 50% or 33% of that value.
211. See supra Table 17.1.
212. See Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Trusting the Process and Mistrusting the Results:
A Structural Perspective on Article 9's Low-Price Foreclosure Rule, 9 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 351, 365, 383 (2001).
213. See Kathleen C. Engel & Particia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics ofPredatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261-62 (2002).
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ture. Some commentators might say lenders designed the loans to lead to
forfeiture. Commentators have criticized asset-based lending in other con-
sumer law contexts, such as home mortgage lending. 2 14 Moreover, title loans
are often huge compared to the borrower's income, as we saw with Ms. Price.
In this context, more than any other, the law should require lenders to lend no
more than what a consumer might be able to repay. Otherwise, we are con-
doning proven forfeiture, as shown here.
E. Frequent Rollover Rates Make Smoothing Consumption a Myth
Industry advocates and a small group of scholars argue that forcing
fringe lenders like title lenders and payday lenders to charge more reasonable
interest rates will put them out of business, which will in turn harm consum-
ers who need these loans. 215 Consumers with low income, so the argument
goes, need loans like these to "smooth consumption" during difficult financial
216
situations.
Smoothing consumption is a myth, however, when rollover and renewal
rates are high, because even if the initial loan achieves this goal, the costs of
the loan hamper the consumer's ability to smooth consumption in the future.
214. See, e.g., Kathleen C. Engel, Patricia A. McCoy, Revisiting A Tale of Three
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 82 TEX. L. REV. 439, 442
n. 15 (2003) (stating that the authors are concerned about "asset-based lending, some-
thing that both we and Ms. Renuart assiduously oppose in residential mortgage lend-
ing")
215. Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1363; Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 431-33.
216. Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1370. For example, in his recent article, Money
to Go, Professor Todd Zywicki concludes that outlawing title loans would be bad for
consumers and that title loans are cheaper and better for consumers than their likely
alternatives. See Money to Go, supra note 17, at 35-37. Many statements in the arti-
cle seem questionable, including that: competition in the title loan business is
"fierce," which keeps the interest rates low; title loan interest rates are strictly regulat-
ed by all but four states; title loan pricing is transparent and easy to understand, mak-
ing it easy for customers to shop around for price; a large percentage of title loan
customers use them to keep small businesses afloat; and 70% of borrowers have more
than one car anyway, and most of the rest have access to public transportation. Id. at
32-33, 37.
Virtually all of the harms Zywicki identifies if these loans disappear are
unsubstantiated. He claims that if a customer could not get a title loan, she would
need to sell her car or use payday loans. Id. at 32. It seems untenable that anyone
would need to sell her car rather than taking out a title loan, at least if they could go
get an endlessly-available payday loan instead. Moreover, many people do have
family or friends, even if they'll only lend, as Zywicki claims, in an emergency. Id. at
36. Zywicki also claims that where high cost credit is eliminated completely, loan
sharking returns. Id. at 37. But is this true? Has this happened in Massachusetts and
other places where they have eliminated payday and title loans? We have seen no
study suggesting as much.
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In Price's case, that extra bill, her title loan payment, was 60% of her monthly
net income. Moreover, even if smoothing were achieved in some percentage
of these loans, the price paid for it is not worth the cost, given that in a high
percentage of these loans, customers lose their vehicles, and arguably, their
jobs.
F. Regulation of Title Lending is Warranted
Despite Obvious Paternalism
The low-income demographic, combined with the over-collateralized,
asset-based lending, as well as the high repossession rates, all point to the
need to regulate title lending. Some people will argue that not allowing peo-
ple to borrow and lend at these rates is paternalistic and interferes with free-
dom of contract.2 17 As a society, we have rejected these arguments in the
context of many middle-class consumer lending products, including, most
recently, credit cards and home loans. 218 Title loans, used most frequently by
the lower and working classes, remain largely unregulated. Yet paternalism
may be more justified among people with lower incomes and less assets and
earning power than among the general population. People with lower income
pay a higher percentage of their income and cash assets than wealthier people
when they pay 300% interest on a loan. Moreover, people who take out title
loans have smaller safety nets, if any, and thus live closer to the financial
edge. Regulating products such people use is more justified than regulating
products used by wealthier people, because the working poor have so much
more to lose.
G. Comparing Title Loans to Payday Loans:
Which is Better for Consumers?
Other scholars have argued that title loans are better for consumers than
payday loans.219 While both are generally harmful to consumers, we feel title
loans are far worse for consumers than payday loans. The answer, however,
can vary depending on the consumer's financial situation, namely whether the
consumer feels able to pay the loan back. Interest rates are lower for title
loans. Rates for title loans in New Mexico range from 88-300%.220 This rate
is roughly half the APR of a payday loan (or their new replacement, the in-
217. See Hawkins, supra note 15, at 1404-07.
218. See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2010) (regulating credit cards).
219. See Consumer Use, supra note 8, at 443-44; see also Hawkins, supra note
15, at 1392-94.
220. See Appendix A.
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stallment loan), which in the New Mexico market typically runs from 417-
560%.221
If a customer is sure she can pay the money back and not borrow more,
the title loan likely would be better. You can only get one title loan, whereas
it is common for people to have several payday loans totaling more than their
entire paychecks. In fact, one woman in a recent study of bankruptcy debtors
222had over thirty payday loans. Thus, a title loan is best if one is sure one
will pay it back in a cycle or two, but finding such a consumer would be dif-
ficult.
In our view, for the average borrower, the disadvantages of title loans
far outweigh the advantages. Title lenders can and do repossess. As one
woman in a survey reported: "title loans are worse [than payday loans]. They
make you take their mandatory local AAA service, and if you are even one
day late, they take your car. They took mine and I lost my job."223 In sum,
title loans are worse than payday loans because of the low loan-to-value ratio.
Moreover, their completely asset-based nature typically makes it impossible
for customers to ever pay back the large loans, and some customers cannot
afford to pay the interest payments. This reality makes repossession and for-
feiture likely.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article uncovers some stark realities about title lending, including
triple-digit interest rates, no attempt by lenders to determine if customers can
afford to pay back the loans, and high repossession rates. Title lending has
gone unregulated in most states, which remains mysterious, given the demo-
graphic that uses title loans and the strong possibility of forfeiture of a vehi-
cle, which could be the customer's most valuable asset. Some of the regula-
tion that could help fix these problems might include absolute interest rate
caps of 36% on all consumer loans,224 more stringent and better enforced
221. See Martin, supra note 16, at 584-85 (stating that a new law capped rates at
417% but that lenders quickly found ways around the new laws and continued to
charge 500% and more).
222. Martin & Tong, supra note 16, at 804.
223. Interview with Payday Loan Customer in Albuquerque, N.M. (June 5, 2009)
(outside payday lender's storefront). This consumer was a participant in author
Nathalie Martin's curbside study, reported about in Martin, supra note 16. Although
the payday lending study was only about payday loans, some consumers also reported
on title loans at the end of their interviews, when asked if they had any other com-
ments.
224. While it is not clear why 36% seems to be the cap that many states choose
when capping interest, this does seem to be the case. Montana just capped interest on
consumer loans at 36% and numerous other states have chosen this same number. See
Plunkett & Hurtado, Small-Dollar Loans, supra note 75, app. A, at 56-63. Plunkett
and Hurtado also propose a national federal interest rate cap of 36%. Id at 50. In
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licensing procedures, and restrictions on rolling over title loans. Other things
that also might be useful are better disclosures to consumers about the total
cost of the loans over the life of the loan, disclosures about the fact that the
loan is an interest-only loan, procedures for enforcing requirements that sales
be commercially reasonable, procedures for ensuring that surpluses are re-
turned to customers, a requirement that interest stop accruing after reposses-
sion, a prohibition against pre-payment penalties, and a requirement that
lenders consider a borrower's ability to repay when lending. Non-compliance
could result in forfeiture of the loan and security agreement.
It is up to the states to decide which of these provisions to adopt. But
consciously or not, we are legislating differently for lower and working class
people than for middle class people. We protect the middle class through a
great web of legislation on the products they use, such as credit cards and
home mortgages. Yet with products that the lower and working classes use,
we do nothing. We do nothing if the Article 9 remedies do nothing to protect
consumers, due to the enormous interest rates. We do nothing about the loss
of one of life's largest assets for the people involved. It is unclear why this is
the case. Is it that the working classes have no political clout? Are the lower
classes hidden enough that this issue does not matter much to the rest of us?
The people who most need protection are not receiving it. While legislatures
around the nation, both federal and state, struggle with how to regulate home
loans, credit cards, and other middle class products, title loans have gone
unnoticed and unregulated. Given the protections we have provided to mid-
dle class consumer credit users, we also should consider regulating the con-
sumer credit products used primarily by the lower and working classes.
2006, recognizing the troubling implications of payday lenders clustering around
military installations, Congress adopted a 36% interest-rate cap on loans to all mili-
tary personnel and their dependents. See John Warner National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266
(2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987) ("A creditor . .. may not impose an annual per-
centage rate of interest greater than 36 percent with respect to the consumer credit
extended to a covered member or a dependent of a covered member."), cited in Chris-
topher L. Peterson, supra note 53, at 1128 & n.88. As Professor Peterson notes, cul-
turally, for whatever reason, we perceive certain interest-rate percentages as ethical
and others as unethical. Id. at 1149-50. Peterson believes that the range of interest
rates perceived as ethical ranges from 6 to 36%. See id at 1150.
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APPENDIX A: ALBUQUERQUE LENDERS PHONE SURVEY
. 3151 San 889- 1 88%-
Mateo 8979 260%
----------------- New 5260 830- 4 240%- $19.50
Mexico Title Loans Montgomery 1808 360%
th 344- 4 520.00%oCheck 'n Go 62 11 4t'34 2.01669
. 3400 San 888- 1 510%
Approved Finance Mto17Mateo 1777
4001 San 889- 17 450%
Ace Cash Express Mto88ateo 8084
American Cash Loan 2928 Carlisle 6126212
Allied Cash Advance 3621 Menaul 00250025
3244 San 888- 1 328% $5.00
Dash 4 CashMae753_____ Mateo 7503
Fast Bucks 4000 Menaul 22772277
Title Cash of New 275- 1 306.60% $5.00
Mexico2900 EubankMexico 7745
Cash 2 Go 883- 3 304.17%
5617 Menaul 050053
4710 San 888- 1 302.00%
Express Cash Pawn Mto99Mateo 9799
2010 349- 2 300.00% $5.00
Wyoming 0923
839- 9 300.00%oQuick Cash 5727 Central 802280
2108 Juan 277- 2 300.00% $5.00
Speedy CashTao83 Tabo 8083
6001 San 884- 1 300.00%
CNC Financial Mto06Mateo 0560
3905 San 888- 2 292.00% $5.00
Mateo 7611
3500 San 830- 1 270.00%
Money Now Mto98ateo 9281
293- 1 254.00%0
Lighthouse Financial 9320 Menaul 4883
M 338- 2 240.00% $8.50
Money Train 5717 Menaul 2580
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APPENDIX B: STATE OF INCORPORATION OF TITLE LENDERS
OPERATING IN ALBUQUERQUE
Ace Cash Express, Inc 17 Texas
Cashmax 1 Illinois
The Cash Store 1 Delaware
Money Train Title Loans 2 Utah
CNC Financial Services 1 Texas
Speedy Loan 4 Delaware
Express Cash Loan, Inc 1 New Mexico
FastBucks 9 Texas
Speedy Bucks 2 New Mexico
Fast Cash Loan, Inc. 1 New Mexico
Lighthouse Financial 1 Florida
Money Network Auto Title 1 Colorado
New Mexico Title Loans 4 Georgia
LoanMax 2 Georgia
Nationwide Budget Finance 1 Missouri
Wild Bill's Fast Cash 1 Nevada
Check N' Go 4 Ohio
Title Cash of New Mexico 1 Alabama
FastBucks 2 Idaho
Ready Money 2 Wisconsin
Total Albuquerque Lenders 61
Number of New Mexico Owners 4
Percent New Mexico Owners 6.56%
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF TITLE LOANS
ANNUAL DATA COLLECTION FOR TITLE LOANS ISSUED BY SMALL
LOAN LICENSEES DURING CALENDAR YEAR 2009
Dollar Amt. of all New Title Loans Originated Min: $50.00
During the Calendar Yr. Max: $10,000.00
Avg: $855.52
Total Principal Dollar Amt. of all Title Loans Total: $5,586,432.51
Outstanding Avg: $85,945.12
Total No. of all Title Loans Outstanding at End of Total: 7184
Calendar Yr. Avg per Co.: 110.52
Total $ Amt. of all New Title Loans Originated Total: $10,785,123.44
During Calendar Yr. Avg per Co: $165,924.98
Annual % Disclosed (pursuant to Fed. Reg. Z) on Min: 0%
New Title Loans Originated During Calendar Yr. Max: 426%
Avg: 266.35%
No. of Days for the Licensee's Initial Maturity Min: 1
Term of New Title Loans Originated During the Max: 910
Calendar Yr. Avg: 55.17
Avg. No. of New Title Loans Made to the Same Avg: 1.9
Customer Originated During the Calendar Yr.
No. of Times Any Title Loan was Renewed, Min: 0
Refinanced, or Extended During the Calendar Yr. Max: 28
Avg: 2.31
No. of Title Loans Charged Off During the Total: 1180
Calendar Yr.
$ Amt. of Title Loans Charged Off During the Total: $908,703.33
Calendar Yr.
$ Amt. of Recoveries of Title Loans During the Total: $1,008,510.88
Calendar Yr.
Gross Yearly Income for any Title Loan Borrower, Min: $2400
as Disclosed to Licensee During the Calendar Yr. Max: $390,000.00
Avg: $24,492.53
No. of Title Loan Borrowers Against Whom Total: 70
Lawsuits Were Instituted
Total No. of Title Loan Repossessions During the Total: 975
Calendar Yr.
Total Number of Title Loan Repossessions Total: 337
Reclaimed by Borrower During the Calendar Yr.
Total Number of Title Loan Repossessions Total: 473
Disposed of By Lender During the Calendar Year
Total $ Amt. of Title Loan Excess Proceeds from Total: $23,079.00
Sale of Repossessed Vehicles Returned to
Borrowers During the Calendar Yr.
Companies Reported Total: 65
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